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FEDERALISM: NECESSARY LEGAL
FOUNDATION FOR THE CENTRAL
MIDDLE EASTERN STATES
Issa Al-Aweel*
ABSTRACT
The Central Middle East—comprising of Syria, Israel, Palestine,
Lebanon, and Jordan—is in need of a legal foundation defined by
a constitutional umbrella that governs it as a whole. This is a
proposed broad structure of such legal foundation that serves
regional legal and economic needs and includes recognition of
human rights.
The need for such restructuring is evident from the persistence of
regional conflict and instability. Conflict and instability have been
constants in the region in general and certainly in the listed five
states. The issues include political instability, terrorism,
continuous threats of fundamentalism, and pervasive disregard to
human life and human rights. Israel has had strife with all the
four neighboring peoples and states. Meanwhile, political
instability either reigns or undermines each of these neighboring
states. This article does not attempt to argue the correctness or
fairness of what manifested in the first half of the 20th century; it
does, however, argue that the political structure and how it
continues to be is part of the reason for the conflicts and the
instability.

* Member and practicing attorney with the Maryland State Bar. I am
in debt to Dean John C. Brittain, Professor of Law and former Acting Dean with
the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, and
colleague Patricia Shnell, for their support, assistance, and invaluable advice,
without which this research and manuscript would not have been completed. I
must acknowledge the Pace International Law Review editing team, in particular
Ms. Emily Golban, for their tireless work.
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This Article presents federalism for the five states as the necessary
political structure and legal foundation, as the one option that
allows the five states to co-exist, to recognize human rights as we
define them today, and to allow for economic and cultural growth.
This Article also argues that such a structure must begin from
within, with the support of the great and global powers including
the United States and Russia.
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INTRODUCTION

The Middle East has witnessed numerous conflicts over the
centuries. The region continues to witness conflicts; however
today these conflicts are arguably more pronounced and have a
larger effect on the global community. The conflicts may be
considered the results of internal conflicting interests where
religious factions battle for control over land and governments.
The conflicts also result from regional and global conflicting
interests where surrounding nations and global powers struggle to
create ties with Middle Eastern governments and to maintain some
control over the region’s resources.
Internally, the region has witnessed infighting between a
multitude of ethnic and religious factions. General and broad
examples of this include, but not limited to, struggles between
Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims, Arab-speaking peoples and
Kurdish populations, and Jews and Muslims.1
Regionally,
struggles between states have mirrored similar ethnic and religious
differences, such that various governments have continuously
attempted to influence other governments and undermine opposing
factions, for instance, Iran and Syria representing a Shiite-type
coalition versus Saudi Arabia and Qatar representing a Sunni-type
coalition.2 The global community, including for example the
United States, Russia, and the European Union, also has economic
and political interests in the region, with the added consequence of
being directly affected by the region’s instability through
terrorism.
For the purposes of this Article, Syria, Israel, Palestine,
Lebanon, and Jordan comprise the Central Middle East. These five
states continue to witness a disproportionate share of the conflicts
1

See, e.g., Andreas Gorzewski, Sunnis, Shiites locked in an endless
conflict, DW (May 1, 2016), https://www.dw.com/en/sunnis-shiites-locked-inan-endless-conflict/a-18958491(explaining conflict between the Sunnis and
Shiites).
2
See Shlomo Brom & Yoel Guzansky, The conflict in Yemen: A case
study of Iran’s limited power, Insight No. 747 INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES
(Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-conflict-in-yemen-acase-study-of-irans-limited-power/ (“All of this has led to the present situation
in which there is a war-by-proxy between a Saudi Arabian-led Sunni coalition
and an Iranian-led Shiite coalition.”).
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in the general region. A large focus of these conflicts revolves
around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Palestine’s, Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah refuse to
partially or fully recognize Israel’s right to exist, and, as a result,
Israel has often argued that these parties continue to pose a deep
security threat to Israel.3 On the other hand, each of Palestine’s,
Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah argue that Israel continues to
violate various areas of international law such as systematic
discrimination and accession of land by force.4 As for Jordan, it is
estimated that half of its citizens are of Palestinian-roots, thus,
creating an arguably precarious effect to Jordan’s current peaceful
relationship with Israel.5
This Article argues that these five states are central to the
Middle East particularly from a political standpoint. In other
words, as the region and the global community struggle with
various interests in the region, these five states attract a
disproportionate amount of those interests, adding to the internally
conflicting interests. The Article further argues that, in large part,
the political and legal structures of these states cannot handle such
multi-level conflicting interests and allow such multi-level
conflicting interests to destabilize the region. As such, the goal of
this Article is to demonstrate that the Central Middle East—
comprised of the five aforementioned states—is in need of a legal
foundation defined by a constitutional umbrella that governs it as a
whole. The other goal is to propose a broad structure for such
legal foundation that serves regional legal needs and includes
declarations of human rights.

3

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33566, LEBANON: THE ISRAELHAMAS-HEZBOLLAH
CONFLICT
1
(2016),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060915_RL33566_8b116c77b728bc405
4f9a71cbaaf24f5b7eabaa3.pdf (“Particularly along Israel's northern front,
achieving peace between the major parties has been an elusive goal. The task
has grown even more complex with the rising influence of non-state political
movements/terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, on Lebanon's
southern border. Neither organization recognizes Israel's right to exist as a
nation-state.”).
4
See, e.g., id. at 10.
5
See, e.g., Murdar Zahran, Jordan Is Palestinian, 19 MIDDLE E. Q. 3, 3
(2012).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1

6

2019]

CENTRAL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES

299

This Article does not attempt to argue the
correctness/incorrectness or fairness/unfairness of what manifested
in the first half of the 20th century. It does, however, argue that the
political structure is the reason for the conflicts and the instability,
that the solution must begin from within, and that the five states
must build on such a structure as a guide to hold each other
accountable.
This Article presents federalism as the solution—
federalism that links the five states through one foundational legal
structure—a structure that enforces overarching principles such as
tolerance and non-discrimination, while also allowing for memberstate autonomy. The argument here is that federalism is the
necessary political structure and legal foundation, establishing
federalism as the one option that serves internal, regional, and
global interests. This is because it allows the five states to coexist, recognize human rights as we define them today, allow for
economic and cultural growth, and promote accountability between
the member states, while also promoting cooperation and trade
with the global community. Additionally, such a structure must
begin from within, with the support of the great and global powers
including the United States and Russia.
Part II describes and highlights the current state of affairs
and effects of the current structure by presenting the general
instabilities as symptoms and as inevitable results of the political
structure, highlighting the need for effective restructuring. Part III
argues that the current political structure is the root of the issue
because it attracts numerous conflicting interests leading to the
conditions described in Part II. Part IV presents federalism as the
effective solution, joining the current Central Middle Eastern states
under one legal structure to decouple the conflicting internal and
external interests, and to position the region to address and handle
these internal and external interests. Part V argues that alternative
structures, such as unions and treaties, have not succeeded in
addressing because such approaches cannot address the conflicting
interests. Part VI discusses the necessary structure and how to
bring it about Part VII attempts to present possible risks.
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II. SYMPTOMS: POLITICAL INSTABILITY, TERRORISM,
FUNDAMENTALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Instabilities within the Middle East, particularly the Central
Middle East, include political instabilities, continuous and longlived threats of violence, fundamentalisms that reflect the views of
small minorities, and violations of multiple areas of human rights
laws.
A. Political Instability
Aside from Israel, governments of Central Middle Eastern
states are under almost constant threat of overthrow. While Israel
has managed to maintain a relatively stable political structure, the
other four states are generally and continuously threatened by
differing factions. Today, multiple conflicting sides struggle to
impose control over not only resources but also ideologies. Such
struggles may be the result of inadequate governing on the part of
the established governments remains, however, that the established
governments play their part by employing systems of oppression as
the approach to maintain control. The result is a multi-faction
struggle for self-rule, imposing structures of governance, control of
resource distribution, and most prominently, definitions of origins
and cultural identities and ideologies.6
Additionally, other factors work as catalysts for instability.
First, the concentration of the holy sites in the Middle East and the
“monopolization of Arabic over Islamic jurisprudence,” give the
Arab historic core great advantage and influence over the region
and over non-Arabic speaking populations.7 Second, oil-rich gulf
states maintain influential effects through “funding conservative
movements and schools” that seek “counter-reformation against
less austere local traditions”8 or non-agreeable governments.
6

See Laurie King-Irani, To Reconcile, or to be Reconciled?: Agency,
Accountability, and Law in Middle Eastern Conflicts, 28 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 369, 385 (2005) (explaining the structures of government in the
central Middle East).
7
P.W. SINGER, THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE
ISLAMIC WORLD, THE 9-11 WAR PLUS 5: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING
FORWARD AT U.S.-ISLAMIC WORLD RELATIONS 24 (2006).
8
Id. at 4.
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Moreover, sectarianism has taken hold. Sectarianism to the
extent it is today is not an ancient identity system, but actually
appeared as a response to “internal and external changes in the
mid-19th century Ottoman Empire.”9 It is arguably the result of
multiple conflicting interests, including ideologies, control of land,
and control of revered sites. The many examples of the
instabilities include the rebellion in Syria and other Arabicspeaking countries, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Lebanon’s
struggles to find a sustainable governing structure.
Thus, the current political structure has not succeeded in
facing the multi-layered challenges. In short, the Arab State
system’s post-colonization continues to lack the “structural [and]
institutional underpinnings” of envisioned nation-statehood.10 The
Cold War supported the structure of these nominal states and
veiled their weaknesses.11 Events of the past sixty or so years have
shown that stability of the current “Middle Eastern states . . . can
be maintained only through coercion and intensified surveillance
of the populace through oppressive intelligence services,”
primarily because of the nominal character of these states.12 In
addition, high birth rates, resulting in demographic changes, add
domestic pressure on Middle Eastern governments, such that the
Middle Eastern ruling powers in totality have been becoming
unable to legitimize their rule and less capable of containing forces
counter to their rule.13 In addition, dysfunctional leaderships have
prevailed and have been other “indices of impunity’s triumph.”14
In summary, political instability with recurring, inescapable
cycles of conflicts between the various factions and against
governing bodies, is one symptom of the need for restructuring. It
is arguable that the instabilities are the results of oppression and
external interests and interference. It is more productive to
consider whether an effective legal foundation and structure would
address the region’s oppressions and conflicting sides and whether
9

King-Irani, supra note 6, at 379.
Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in
the Middle East, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 191, 193 (1999).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 195.
13
Id. at 198.
14
King-Irani, supra note 6, at 384.
10
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such foundation would allow a government to meet its
populations’ needs as well as to handle external interests and in
turn affect stability.
B. Terrorism
Another symptom of the need for a legal foundation and
structure is terrorism. The New Oxford American Dictionary
Online defines terrorism as “[t]he unlawful use of violence and
intimidation . . . in the pursuit of political aims,”15 implying that
the desire for political change or political goals is the driving force.
The United States Code defines terrorism, international and
domestic, in part as activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life . . . [and]
(B) appear to be intended
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping.16
...

In 2006, when addressing the 9/11 attacks, Singer noted
that for recurring and group terrorist attacks, an inspiring leader is
necessary to build off of a base of existing “economic, political,
social, and cultural crises.”17
Singer argues that there are two divergent approaches to
understanding terrorism. First the root cause approach, which
maintains that “poverty, ignorance, and lack of political expression
provide [a] breeding ground for terrorist organization.”18 Second,
the security threat approach, which maintains that the “focus on
15

Terrorism,
OXFORD
DICTIONARY,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
16
18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-8).
17
SINGER, supra note 7, at 4.
18
Id.
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intelligence, protection, and coercive action” prevent terrorism,
and that socioeconomic deprivation have no connection to
terrorism, citing that Bin Laden and his group were neither poor
nor uneducated.19 Singer adds that both approaches are right and
wrong in that a leader who can inspire distinguishes one radical
group from another, but the appeal becomes seductive when
economic, political, social, and cultural crises combine.20
Activities falling under the traditional definitions or code
are amply reported in the news, whether in a Central Middle
Eastern state,21 other regional states such as Turkey22 or Pakistan,
Europe,23 or the United States.24
Moreover, an arguable
commonality between many of these events is that the actors often
justify the acts in the name of religion, and that the actors, as well
as the acts, are connected to the Middle East in one way or another.
The frequency and constancy of these terrorist acts make it clear
19

Id.; see Mohamed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism
in the Muslim World: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 221, 222–23 (2008) (pointing to poverty, ignorance, and lack of political
expression as one approach to understanding terrorism).
20
SINGER, supra note 7, at 4.
21
See Gili Cohen, Hebron Brothers in Custody for Sniper Attacks
Against
Israelis,
HAARETZ
(Feb.
29,
2016,
7:40
PM),
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.706186; see also Gili Cohen &
Chaim Levinson, Israeli Policeman Stabbed in West Bank Village Near Jericho,
HAARETZ (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:35 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/1.706704.
22
See Murad Sezer & Osman Orsal, Two Female Militants Killed After
Attacking Police Station Outside Istanbul, HAARETZ (Mar. 3, 2016, 12:40 PM),
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.706717; Declan Walsh, et al.,
Taliban Attack at Bacha Khan University in Pakistan Renews Fears, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/asia/bachakhan-university-attackcharsadda.html?emc=edit_na_20160120&nlid=67698734&ref=cta&_r=0.
23
Murad Makhmudov, et al., Islamists Slaughter at least 120 people in
Paris: France on the Wrong Side of History in Libya and Syria, MODERN
TOKYO
NEWS
(Nov.
14,
2015),
https://moderntokyonews.com/2015/11/14/islamists-slaughter-at-least-120people-in-paris-france-on-the-wrong-side-of-history-in-libya-and-syria/.
24
Michael S. Schmidt & Salman Masood, San Bernardino Couple
Spoke of Attacks in 2013, F.B.I. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/san-bernardino-massacrefbi.html?emc=edit_na_20151209&nlid=67698734&ref=cta.
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that we have allowed such acts to become too common a headline
to continue without a vision that directly addresses the motivations.
When considering the security perspective as described by
Singer, it is arguable that a new approach to security is needed
because violence in the Middle East, in the shape of terrorism, is
carried out by irregular warriors who are fundamentalists or ethnic
nationalists and are unlikely to be contained by institutionalized
armies.25 However, regardless of whether it is economics and/or
security that hold the key to addressing terrorism, it is interesting
that while fundamentalists are succeeding in using Islam as the
motivation and basis for their movements, the overarching
principle in Islam concerning violence is embodied in the Quranic
verse: The taking of one life is like the killing of all humankind.26
In turn, for a society or a government to claim that Islam is the
cause or motivation of terrorist acts against it would be avoiding
the actual issue, regardless of whether those acts were in attempt to
intimidate, coerce, or influence in the name of Islam.
A broad perspective notes that Islamist movements have
used confrontation as a tool to de-couple the region from the West,
from Western interests, Western values, and Western influence.27
In contrast, there is barely any evidence of other movements, such
as the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Basque region, or Central
and South America, having become conflicts with a global effect.
One explanation perhaps is that the Muslim or the Arabic-speaking
populations are much larger than populations involved in
aforementioned conflicts. While this is true, this point supports the
argument for the multi-level conflicting interests—that the conflict
in the Central Middle East draws internal and global conflicting
interests that are leading to internal, regional, and global terrorism.
Taken a step further, a more focused perspective points to the
25

Tibi, supra note 10, at 204.
See Hassanien, supra note 19, at 230. See generally Greg Callaghan,
‘Islamism is not Islam’: confronting Europe’s terrorism problem, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Dec. 8, 2018) (quoting Ed Husain, author of The Islamist:
“mainstream Muslims are drowned out by Islamists . . . .” and “most Muslims
know
that
Islamism
is
not
Islam[.]”)
https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/islamism-is-not-islam-confrontingeurope-s-terrorism-problem-20181204-p50k0f.html.
27
Tibi, supra note 10, at 197.
26
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conflict between Israel and the Arab-speaking populations as a
conflict that fuels the larger part of today's terrorism,28 or at the
minimum contributes to the rise of ‘inspiring leadership.’
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict effectively pins those of the
Jewish faith against the Palestinians in particular, but also against
the rest of the Middle Eastern populations. Zionist leaders,
through the Jewish National Fund, pursued and purchased land in
what was Palestine29 and, eventually, relying on the Balfour
Declaration to declare independence, fought the 1948 war and
expelled the Palestinians.30 The Zionist movement and ideology
was central to the establishment of Israel, not simply as a state, but
as a Jewish state.31 Israel’s Declaration of Independence asserts
that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, dismissing the
presence of other peoples with a claim to lands in the area and
referring to Palestinians as illegitimate inhabitants of the land.32
Israel is a Jewish state is in its legal foundation, legislated in 1950,
and repeated in practices as well as further legislation in 1992.33
28

See Hassanien, supra note 19, at 226, 231 (discussing the conflict
and how it has been the driving force behind today’s terrorism); see also
SINGER, supra note 7, at 4.
29
See John Dever & James Dever, The Occupation of Truth, 33 MISS.
C. L. REV. 39, 40 (2014).
30
Authors debate the start of the war, with Jewish writers pointing to
Palestinians rejecting the United Nations Resolution of partitioning the land into
Israel and Palestine and taking up arms against the Jewish population and
eventually losing land in Israel’s War of Independence. See, e.g., Shlomo Gazit,
Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points, 555
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 82, 83 (1998). Other authors point to
Israel starting the war after declaring independence and forcibly dispossessing
Palestinians from their homeland. See, e.g., Dever & Dever, supra note 29, at
40.
31
See generally Rabbi Ed Snitkoff, Secular Zionism: From Religious
Idea
to
Secular
Ideology,
MY
JEWISH
LEARNING
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/secular-zionism/ (last visited Apr.
16, 2019) (explaining Zionism as a whole).
32
Pnina Lahav, A “Jewish State . . . to Be Known as the State of
Israel”: Notes on Israeli Legal Historiography, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 402
(2001).
33
See Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752, § 1(a) (as amended) (Isr.),
translated in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, KNESSET,
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2019) [hereinafter Basic Law: Human Dignity] (Isr.) (stating that this law’s
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Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of Israel as a
Jewish state, objectively the issue in its simplest is that such an
approach is pinning the Jewish population against the Muslim
population with regional players and global powers essentially
taking sides. The Muslim population in turn has a common cause
against Israel as well as global powers supporting Israel. While the
vast majority of Muslims do not react with violence,34 the pretext
remains the same in its simplest form—Jews and Muslims against
each other, in turn pinning the whole of the Muslim population
with a common cause. This is not to say that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is the one source and cause of terrorism, but rather, that the
conflict and the resulting conflicting interests, are contributors.
Middle Easterners, or those of Middle Eastern descent,
involved in terrorist acts either internally or globally, come from
various backgrounds. They may be, for example, of Palestinian
origin, Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Turkish, or Saudi Arabian, or
from other Persian Gulf countries, northern African countries, or
may even be Europeans with Middle Eastern backgrounds. By the
same token, and regarding the Islamic State (“IS”), it has become
well-established that foreign fighters comprise a large portion of IS
fighters.35
It is granted that the reasons for Middle-Eastern-related
terrorism are broader than simply the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
For example, the New York Times reported on the attack on
Charlie Hebdo as a ten-year deepening radicalism fueled by
American soldiers humiliating Muslims.36 Thus, the reasons for

purpose is, in part, to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as
a Jewish and democratic state).
34
See ANTHONY CORDESMAN, ISLAM AND THE PATTERNS IN
TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES
(CSIS) 1, 23–25, 46, 52 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/islamand-patterns-terrorism-and-violent-extremism (Working Draft).
35
See Anna Altman, Opinion, How Many Foreign Fighters Have
Joined ISIS?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:29 AM), http://optalk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/how-many-foreign-fighters-have-joinedisis/.
36
Rukmini Callimachi & Jim Yardley, From Amateur to Ruthless
Jihadist
in
France,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/world/europe/paris-terrorism-brothers-
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Middle-Eastern-related terrorist activities must be considered from
a broader perspective, one that considers the current political
structure as well as the ramifications of the structure leading to
multi-level conflicting interests.
European countries, the United States, and Russia, have all
maintained interests and influence in the region. Most notably, the
United States consistently has had a foreign policy that supports
Israel as the best means to support its interests.37 In short, while
neither the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor Islam, can be the
scapegoat for explaining today’s Middle Eastern-related terrorist
acts, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does spill over to bordering
countries, regional countries, as well as global powers, and attracts
conflicting interests leading to terrorism in the name of a common
cause and led by inspiring leaders—Muslims against Israel and the
West.
C. Fundamentalism
The combination of human development gaps and broken
regimes to a large extent explains the failing environment in which
radicals thrive.38 Al-Qaeda’s popularity has been, in part, due to
its ability to draw from the sense of frustration that poorly
educated youth, those lacking the skills for employment and
alienated from their local system and the global political systems,
feel.39
The current population in the Middle East as a whole is
projected to almost double, with a growth rate of around 130%,
because approximately half the Arab population, Iranians, and
Pakistanis are younger than twenty years old; in comparison,
slightly more than one-quarter of the populations in Western
countries are younger than twenty-years old.40 With current
said-cherif-kouachi-charliehebdo.html?emc=edit_na_20150117&nlid=67698734&_r=0.
37
See Zack Beauchamp, Why the US has the Most Pro-Israel Foreign
Policy
in
the
World,
VOX
(July
24,
2014,
9:00
AM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends (explaining that the
United States maintains strong ties with Israel).
38
SINGER, supra note 7, at 11.
39
Id. at 18.
40
Id. at 17.
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regional structures, continued stagnant political systems, and weak
infrastructure, Middle Eastern youth will lack the opportunities
necessary to fulfill their aspirations, leading up to what the World
Economic Forum refers to as a “ticking time-bomb.”41 In addition
to the lack of opportunities as a contributing factor to a dark future,
through 2016, ISIS tapped into the population trend to indoctrinate
fundamentalism in children, training them for jihad.42
Damaged Israeli, Palestinian, Lebanese, and more recently
Syrian societies provide a nurturing environment for extremism
and political violence.43 Moreover, fundamentalist jihadists have
been exporting the same fundamental ideology used in Saudi
Arabia into the Central Middle Eastern region, arguably in attempt
to overpower those states and institute Wahhabist version of Sunni
Islam.44 The Wahhabist vision is an unyielding form of Islam,
allowing no room for diversity or disagreement and, instead, is
dedicated to a militant form of Islam.45 It places jihad on the same
level as the ‘five pillars’46—Muslim life, prayer, concern for the
needy, self-purification, and the pilgrimage. As the ‘five pillars’
are mandatory, fundamentalists make jihad mandatory as well, in
spite of the stark difference in the underlying motivation, where
peace is clearly a foundation to the ‘five pillars.’47
Moreover, Middle-Eastern born fundamentalism is
certainly not contained within any Middle Eastern borders, such
that it is a global issue. For instance, the New York Times
reported in the summer of 2014 that European governments were
41

Id. (quoting World Economic Forum, Roundtable on Arab
Competitiveness, Doha, Qatar, Apr. 2005).
42
Mark Townsend, How Islamic State is training child killers in
doctrine of hate, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2016, 2:20 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/05/islamic-state-trains-purerchild-killers-in-doctrine-of-hate.
43
King-Irani, supra note 6, at 373.
44
See Donald W. Garner & Robert L. McFarland, Suing Islam: Tort,
Terrorism and the House of Saud, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 231–32 (2007)
(noting Saudi Arabia’s uniquely intolerant and dangerous version of Islam now
resulting in jihad throughout the world and the Saud/Wahhab pact dedicated to
spreading Sunni Islam).
45
Id. at 225.
46
Id. at 233.
47
Id.
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paying millions to Al-Qaeda in ransom for kidnappings.48 In
addition, Islamic militants have been able to recruit and train
Middle Eastern westerners, including Americans, to fight
alongside and for the same militant ideology.49 The western
recruits do not necessarily lack education or employment.50
According to news reports, the Islamic State has been able to draw
hundreds of individuals from Europe and elsewhere, where these
individuals have included educated young men such as Mr.
Emwazi and Mr. Abusalha, both individuals involved in videos
showing beheadings.51 Therefore, with respect to Westerners, lack
of education does not necessarily explain the draw to
fundamentalism.
As such, it is arguable that Middle Eastern conditions—the
conditions that are attracting conflicting internal and regional
interests—are fostering fundamentalism and, in turn,
fundamentalists have been able to sell a common cause against
identifiable enemies such as Western governments and states,
Israel, and Middle Eastern governments, who traditionally have
48

Rukmini Callimachi, Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda
Terror,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europebecomes-al-qaedas-patron.html.
49
See Michael S. Schmidt & Mark Mazzetti, Suicide Bomber From
U.S. Came Home Before Attack, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/us/suicide-bomber-from-us-came-homebefore-attack.html?emc=edit_na_20140730&nlid=67698734.
50
See generally Margaret Coker & Jenny Gross, Islamic State Militant
Known as ‘Jihadi John’ Identified, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2015, 7:08 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-militant-known-as-jihadi-johnidentified-1424955642 (reporting on Mr. Emwazi as a university-educated
Londoner, and identified as the masked Islamic State militant appearing in
videos showing the beheading of hostages); Kenan Malik, Opinion,
Assimilation’s Failure, Terrorism’s Rise, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011)
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/opinion/07malik.html (analyzing why so
many young men, intelligent and integrated, found violence and reactionary
ideology attractive.).
51
See generally Coker & Gross, supra note 50; Mark Mazzetti, et al.,
Suicide Bomber Is Identified as a Florida Man, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/middleeast/american-suicidebomber-in-syria.html (reporting that Americans, traveling to Syria to fight with
the Nusra group against the Syrian government, come from diverse backgrounds
and upbringings, including Mr. Abusalha as a suicide bomber in Syria).
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followed tyrannical rule.
D. Devaluation of Human Life and Violation of Human Rights
1.

Priorities of the Leaders in Central Middle Eastern States

It is clear that international law does not extend to the
Middle East, possibly due in part to a culture that repels critical
questions and, in the process, frustrates the application of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and deflects attempts at
criminal prosecutions and restorative justice.52 At the same time, it
is also likely that human rights law is not a priority and is at best
third to the conflicting interests and the pervasive political
instability in the region.
The Syrian and Jordanian governments are known for
disregarding human rights. Bejesky quotes a former CIA agent
and states, “[i]f you want a serious interrogation, you send a
prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them
to Syria.”53 In 2004, American immigration officials informed a
travelling Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, that he would be sent to
Syria to be tortured; American officials delivered on their promise
and sent Mr. Arar to Jordanian officials who in turn transferred
him to Syria.54 The Syrians interrogated Mr. Arar for eighteen
hours a day for twelve days, regularly beat him with an electrical
cable, and struck him with their fists.55 More recently, in 2011,
human rights organizations called on the United Nations Security

52

King-Irani, supra note 6, at 372.
Robert Bejesky, Sensibly Construing the “More Likely Than Not”
Threshold for Extraordinary Rendition, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 221, 241
(2013); Layla Nadya Sadat, “Torture and the War on Terror”: Ghost Prisoners
and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 314 (2006)) (quoting Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/fact-sheet-extraordinary-rendition
(last
visited July 18, 2019)).
54
Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic
Assurances and the Legality of "Rendition”, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 213–14
(2006).
55
Id. at 214.
53
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Council to act and address the Syrian government’s brutal
crackdown against civilian protesters.56
As for Lebanon, in 2013 the United of States Department
of State reported that human rights abuses include, among others,
torture, harsh prison conditions, harassment, and arbitrary arrest
and detention of Syrian political activists.57
The Israeli government also continuously violates human
rights laws. In the 1990’s, Israel subjected suspected Palestinian
militants to detention without trial and interrogation methods that
included binding, hooding, and sleep deprivation.58 While torture
methods may have changed in Israel due to an Israeli Supreme
Court ruling in 1999,59 violations of human rights against
Palestinians persist which include rights to self-determination and
to property.60
One broad example of human rights violations that Middle
Eastern states and their leaders have implemented is emergency
law, particularly in Syria and Israel. The doctrine of emergency
56

Andrew Baskin, Human Rights Organizations Seek to Refer Syria to
The International Criminal Court, 27 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1010 (2011).
57
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS &
LABOR, LEBANON 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2012), https://20092017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid
=204372
58
Jennifer Moore, Practicing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for
Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 33, 42 (2006).
59
See id. at 43; HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v.
Israel 53(4) PD 817, para. 39 (1999) (“[a] democracy must sometimes fight with
one hand tied behind it’s back”); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 21 (2002) (noting
the tension between the need to protect the state and the rights of the individual
in the context of threats of terrorism).
60
Rep. of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to
Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements on The Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the Palestinian People Throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/63 (2013) [hereinafter Situation in Palestine] (discussing Israel is
clearly violating Palestinians' right to self-determination and the right to
determine how to implement self-determination and the right to permanent
sovereignty); Comm. on Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination,
Concluding Observations: Israel, para. 25 CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, (April 3,
2012) (Israel's planning and zoning policy in East Jerusalem, as well as in other
parts of the West Bank, breaches Palestinian's fundamental rights).
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law is a last resort mechanism implemented for the common good,
temporarily suspending certain freedoms to facilitate the return of
normalcy.61 The Syrian government implemented and maintained
an emergency state for approximately fifty years, all in the name of
the enemy Israel.62 The Israeli government continues to maintain
its emergency state.63 Repeated use of emergency law by ruling
powers does not necessarily mean to restore normalcy, but is more
to maintain control and convince their populations that it is
necessary.64
These are the choices those in power make. Leaders can
choose to work towards peace and co-existence, or choose control
through oppression and discrimination. One mitigating factor may
be the balancing of interests. Thus far, political leaders as well as
leaders of factions in the Middle East have either confused the
definition of statehood or used it to their advantage, such that they
consistently connect statehood to ethnicity and religion. This is
true for Assad's regime in Syria, the kings of Jordan, the leaders in
Israel, the Palestinian movements, and, less so but still, the polity
in Lebanon. This is largely because the interests of each group
separately outweigh the interests of the population in general. For
instance, Israel has stronger interests in acquiring land and
Judaizing the area under its control as opposed to treating nonJews like Palestinians equally, or promoting Palestinian selfdetermination.65 Similarly in Syria, the Assad regime has a
61

John Reynolds, Emergency, Governmentality, and the Arab Spring,
JADALIYYA
(Aug.
10,
2011),
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2357/emergency-governmentality-andthe-arab-spring.
62
See Shubra Ohri, International Legal Updates: Human Rights in an
Arab Spring, 18 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 45, 46 (2011) (discussing the emergency
decrees of governments of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and Yemen that violated
international law by prohibiting the rights to assemble and freedom of
expression).
63
See Yoav Mehozay, The Fluid Jurisprudence of Israel’s Emergency
Powers: Legal Patchwork as a Governing Form, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 137,
137 (2012) (discussing Israel's complex emergency jurisprudence).
64
Ohri, supra note 62, at 46.
65
See Situation in Palestine, supra note 60, ¶¶ 59, 61 (reporting that the
Israeli government aims to alter the composition of Jerusalem by erasing
cultural heritage on the basis of religious affiliation, by emphasizing Jewish
cultural heritage while disregarding the heritage of other cultures); see also id.
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stronger interest in maintaining control as opposed to allowing
Sunnis to attain power.66
2.

Torture, Discrimination and Inequalities

Current governments, certainly in Israel, Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, and Jordan, devalue and disrespect human life to the
point that killing and torture are pervasively accepted norms.67
Two of the worst offenders of human rights in the Middle East
may be Syria and Israel.68 It remains, however, that all of the five
states continue to disregard international law and conventions such
that
victims
remain
individually
and
collectively
unacknowledged.69 These states kill and torture indiscriminately
in the name of state security.70 Unfortunately, the standards we
have achieved in International Humanitarian Law appear to be
considered as formalities, possibly seen as unachievable, as
opposed to standards towards which to aspire.
The United States is a prime suspect in this regard, being at
the forefront of torture techniques, and as such, implicitly

para. 68 (reporting that East Jerusalem's Palestinian population experience
forced evictions, discriminatory building regulations, demolition orders,
residence permit restrictions, and acute housing shortage).
66
See generally William R. Polk, Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil
War
to
Post-Assad,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
10,
2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-syriafrom-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/ (explaining that the Assad regime
instills fear to maintain control).
67
See, e.g., Oren Liebermann, Palestinian authorities routinely 'arrest
and torture' critics, says Human Rights Watch report, CNN (Oct. 23, 2018,
3:09PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/23/middleeast/west-bank-gaza-humanrights-watch-report-intl/index.html.
68
King-Irani, supra note 6, at 372–73.
69
Id. at 377–78.
70
See also Liebermann, supra note 67 (“‘We documented dozens of
cases of people detained for a Facebook post, for writing a critical article in a
mainstream publication, for protesting, for being involved with the wrong group
or movement,’ said Omar Shakir, Israel-Palestine director for HRW, at a press
conference in Ramallah announcing the report. In detention, detainees routinely
are threatened, beaten, subjected to foot whipping, in many cases subjected to
torture.”).
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permitting and encouraging other states to follow suit.71 Granted,
torture and torture techniques are not new. Europeans, and the
Ottomans before them, used such techniques, colonized, and
implemented apartheid in numerous parts of the world.72
However, humanity collectively has chosen to articulate
humanitarian law and to aspire to its standards.
Yet, the Syrian regime continues to capture and torture any
person speaking or alluding to opposing the regime; this practice
has continued to a larger scale and became even more focused
when the opposition began in 2011.73 For example, Syrian
intelligence is documented to beat and murder members of the
Kurdish population, including women, who voiced or were
suspected of voicing any opposition.74
Jewish Israelis consider their country democratic, and go as
far as considering it the only democratic state in the Middle East;75
yet, the extent of democracy goes only as far as voting does,
allowing non-Jews to vote, but in fact effecting an ethnic
democracy76 and extending aspects of democracy only to the
Jewish portion of the population. Some argue that Israel has

71

See generally USA and Torture: A History of Hypocrisy, HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Dec.
9,
2014,
9:04
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/09/usa-and-torture-history-hypocrisy.
72
See generally History.com Editors, Ottoman Empire, HISTORY.COM
(last updated Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/middleeast/ottoman-empire.
73
See generally Joe Sterling, Daraa: The spark that lit the Syrian
flame,
CNN
(Mar.
1,
2012,
9:32
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisisbeginnings/index.html (“When the schoolchildren were arrested in late February
2011, they were accused of scrawling graffiti on a school that said ‘the people
want to topple the regime.’ Masalmeh, the activist, said security went to a
school, interrogated students and rounded up suspects.”).
74
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS
& LABOR, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SYRIA 2–3
(2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160478.pdf.
75
Roger I. Zakheim, Israel in the Human Rights Era: Finding A Moral
Justification for the Jewish State, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1005, 1008
(2004).
76
See id. at 1010–13 (explaining why Israel is considered an “ethnic
democracy”).
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developed a class system, inherent in its legal code.77 The
government heavily discriminates against any non-Jew.78 Israeli
Arabs are heavily underrepresented,79 in spite of the 'democratic'
voting, and even when they are represented, those in power often
censure and threaten anyone who speaks or acts unfavorably,
calling such a person anti-Israel and a conspirer. Moreover, in the
context of the Occupied Territories, Israel goes as far as to
implement policies of collective punishment against Palestinians.80
These methods have not worked for either Syria or Israel,
certainly not for the region in light of continued violence and
conflicts; the methods have not achieved anything that resembles
peace or stability. Israelis are more fearful than in preceding years
as hatred between Jews and Arabic-speaking Palestinians
continues to grow.81
III. CURRENT STATE AND LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL
MIDDLE EAST IS THE ROOT OF THE REGION’S POLITICAL
INSTABILITY, MIDDLE-EASTERN RELATED TERRORISM, AND
MIDDLE-EASTERN FUNDAMENTALISM
A. Numerous Conflicting Interests
Conflicts, old and new, have been persistent and long-lived
in virtually all parts of the Central Middle East. Israel has had its
77

See id. at 1013 (“In Israel, for example, the emerging constitution
does not enjoin the state from exhibiting partiality towards the different cultural,
ethnic, and religious conceptions of its majority”).
78
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ, Soc, and
Cultural Rts, Rep. on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, ¶ 237, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1998/26 (1999) (“The Committee notes with grave concern that the
Status Law of 1952 authorizes the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency
and its subsidiaries, including the Jewish National Fund, to control most of the
land in Israel, since these institutions are chartered to benefit Jews exclusively.”)
79
Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in DeeplyDivided Societies: The Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 345, 349 (2008).
80
John Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid, International Law, and
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 867, 903 (2013).
81
Daniel Bar-Tal & Eran Halperin, Societal Beliefs and Emotions as
Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution, 19 PALESTINEISR. J. POL’Y, ECON. & CULTURE 18, 22–23 (2014).
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disputes with Palestinians, just as Hamas demands support from its
Palestinian civilians.82 Syria, prior to its civil war, focused much
of its efforts and interests in weakening Israel’s position and
gaining leverage possibly by supporting Hamas against Israel.
Interests from regional states have included support for Hamas
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar;83 similarly with Lebanon’s
Hezbollah, which is reputed to receive support from Iran.
As for global powers, arguably through 2010, the United
States for example maintained a policy of preventing democracy
and supporting dictators, with the view that the Muslim public
would act against United States’ interests if democracy were to
take hold.84 In turn, Middle Eastern dictators have oppressed their
people, including in Syria and Jordan, leading to unfavorable
economic as well as political conditions.85 With such support from
the West, ruling powers in the Arabic-speaking world failed to
address issues that generally give rise to social unrest, and were
unable to provide substantive stability and economic development
because these powers were rather preoccupied with maintaining
control.86 These conditions have combined to nourish radicalism,
supporting Singer’s argument that radical movements require
leadership along with unfavorable economic and political
conditions.87
This picture demonstrates the multi-level conflicting
interests, those internal to Central Middle Eastern states, as well as
82

See Shira Rubin, Palestinians have spent decades battling Israel.
Now they’re battling each other, VOX (Aug. 22, 2017, 9:00AM),
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/22/16114696/palestinian-hamas-israelindependence-netanyahu-abbas-trump.
83
See Hannibal Travis, Wargaming the “Arab Spring”: Predicting
Likely Outcomes and Planning U.N. Responses, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 75, 84
(2013) (noting also Al-Jazeera as a powerful political and social phenomenon
with a consistent objective and with seed money from Qatar).
84
See, e.g., Nader Hashemi, The Arab Spring, U.S. Foreign Policy, and
the Question of Democracy in the Middle East, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
31, 32, 35 (2012).
85
See Tibi, supra note 10, at 195–96 (noting that Arab Middle Eastern
have maintained stability through coercion and oppressive intelligence service,
but have become weaker while neighboring states such as Turkey and Iran have
grown stronger).
86
Id. at 198.
87
SINGER, supra note 7, at 8.
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those regional and global. For example, internal conflicting
interests exist between Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Regional
conflicting interests include those of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran,
who all have maintained support for various brokers internal to
Central Middle Eastern states.88 Global interests include those of
the United States as one global power that has maintained a policy
best suited for its own interests. While the picture and “alliances”
may have changed somewhat post-2010, the presence of multilevel conflicting interests has only grown.
In late 2010, the Arab Spring took off in several Middle
Eastern and North African countries, and continues in some form
in Syria.89 As a Central Middle Eastern state, the conflict in Syria
exemplifies the multi-level conflicting interests because of internal,
regional, and global involvements.
The rebellion in Syria began with, mildly stated, citizenry
dissatisfaction. It started with protests in a city situated south of
Damascus.90 The protests soon spread into other cities, with
demands for alleviating emergency law and for dismembering the
Syrian security and intelligence forces.91 The ruling party—the
Assad government—eventually relented in regard to the
emergency law, but not in regard to the security forces.92 The
rebels escalated their protests and demanded that Assad step
down.93 The protests became an armed conflict within a few
months, with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and likely Turkey, reputed to
have provided weapons and financial support to the rebels.94
88

See Marc Lynch, The New Arab Order, 97 FOREIGN AFF., 116, 118,
121 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new-araborder.
89
See
Arab
Spring,
HISTORY.COM,
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring (last updated Apr. 5,
2019).
90
See Sterling, supra note 73.
91
See Thilo Marauhn, Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights
Council Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict-the Case of Syria, 43 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 401, 403 (2013).
92
Khaled Yacoub Oweis Syria's Assad ends state of emergency,
REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2011, 8:53 PM,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-idUSTRE72N2MC20110421
93
Marauhn, supra note 91, at 403.
94
See Patrick Smith, Obama is Facing 2 Critical Questions to
Negotiating Peace in Syria, THE FISCAL TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016, 7:43 PM),
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Neither side appeared to gain enough ground. Eventually, there
were foreign fighters on the streets kidnapping Christians and
implementing Islamic courts in various cities of the country.95
By 2014, fighters claiming to be part of the Islamic State
were appearing in the northeastern parts of the country as well as
in northern Iraq96. In 2016, such fighters were not only inflicting
pain and fear among various populations, but were also providing
an appeal to numbers of young men and women.97 Highlighting
the concept of conflicting interests, Syria’s government has
considered the opposition as terrorism supported by outside
interests.98
As a militant group that preceded IS, Al-Qaeda came into
public view in conjunction with the Taliban in Afghanistan in the
late 1990s.99 While such movements made appearances across
other parts of the Middle East and Africa, these appearances were
sporadic and their connectedness appeared minimal.100 However,

https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-faces-syria-peace-talks-questions20163?utm_source=feedburner&amp%3Butm_medium=referral&utm_medium=feed
&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+businessinsider+%28Business+Insider%29.
95
Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Islamic State in Syria abducts at least 150
Christians, REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2015, 3:28 AM,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-christians/islamicstate-in-syria-abducts-at-least-150-christians-idUSKBN0LS0MH20150224.
96
See Zack Beauchamp, et al., 27 maps that explain the crisis in Iraq,
VOX (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq.
97
See Ayman S. Ibrahim, What Makes ISIS Appealing, FIRST THINGS
(Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2014/10/whatmakes-isis-appealing; Jethro Mullen, What is ISIS’ Appeal for Young People,
CNN
(Feb.
25,
2015,
2:33
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/index.html.
98
‘Terrorism exported to Middle East from Europe’ – Assad, RT (Dec.
4, 2014, 10:45 PM), https://www.rt.com/news/211583-terrorism-syria-europeassad/.
99
See The U.S. War in Afghanistan 1999–2019, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan (last visited May
20, 2019) (laying out Al-Queda’s and the Taliban’s timeline).
100
See, e.g., CLAYTON THOMAS, AL QAEDA AND U.S. POLICY: MIDDLE
EAST AND AFRICA (2018) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf (noting
presence of Al-Qaeda factions and activities in the Middle East and Africa);
David H. Shinn, Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn, 28 J. CONFLICT STUD.
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these movements have shown gradual growth through the first
decade of the 21st century, and then through the Arab Spring in
numbers and strength, with support from Persian Gulf countries,
particularly Qatar.101 Qatar, by 2013, has also been cited to have
security and diplomatic links to Israel and the United States.102
ISIS’ activities in Syria and Iraq point to the continued
growth of conflicting interests.
One obvious reason such
movements must not be allowed to take hold is human rights and
atrocities.
Recent news of kidnappings and the payment of
ransoms to Al-Qaeda and its direct affiliates in Europe103 as well as
violence, can easily take hold in the United States if all the
involved nation-states maintain their current trajectories.104 Thus,
one must consider Middle Eastern affairs after 2010, of Al-Qaeda,
of IS, of fundamentalists kidnaping Europeans,105 and of
population trends in the Middle East,106 in conjunction with and as
part of one picture.

47, 48–49, 69 (2007) (analyzing Al-Qaeda’s presence, success, and in regard to
some terrorist attacks lack of evidence of involvement).
101
See David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East and How to
Stop
it,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
29,
2015)
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-startedsyria-iraq/412042/ (noting “[i]t was Saudi Arabia and Qatar, jockeying for
regional influence, that funded a scattershot array of Sunni militias that proved
easy recruiting grounds for the extremists . . .”); Editorial Board, Opinion,
Fighting, While Funding, Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-qatar-isisterrorism.html (pointing to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran as supporters of
extremist groups; for example, noting that Qatar has supported radicals in Syria,
and noting that while Saudi Arabia has become more serious against extremism
and has “taken a zero-tolerance approach to ISIS . . . American government
reports say financial support for terrorism from Saudis remains a threat . . . .”).
102
See Travis, supra note 83, at 79.
103
Callimachi & Yardley, supra note 36; Callimachi, supra note 48.
104
See, e.g., Marc Santora & Stephanie Clifford, 3 Brooklyn Men
Accused of Plot to Aid ISIS’ Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/nyregion/3-men-in-brooklyn-chargedsupporting-isis.html (reporting on the involvement of 3 young men, citizens of
Uzbekistan and living in Brooklyn, NY, in providing material support to the
Islamic State).
105
Callimachi & Yardley, supra note 36.
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The threat is present in Europe arguably in part because
radicals use European systems, including criminal justice systems
and prisons, while European governments fail to distinguish
between a contributing citizen and a dormant-appearing radical, or
fail to embrace individuals with Middle Eastern backgrounds.107 A
more frightening concept is that this same threat, today in Syria
and Iraq, can easily reach European countries and the United
States. The radical movements demonstrate the conflicts, and the
conflicting interests. The movements themselves receive support
and aid. More importantly, however, is that it is the political
structure that is allowing such movements to thrive through the
multi-level interests as opposed to a cohesive internal political and
legal system.
Hashemi argues that two basic priorities intersect in the
region—oil, and the State of Israel.108 From another perspective,
Tibi implies that the instability arises from a fundamental conflict
between secular nationalists and their foes, where secular
nationalists are committed to the existing Middle Eastern nationstate system, while their foes seek a regional order based on their
understanding of Islamic teachings.109 Tibi argues that the regional
Arab states, post-Ottoman and post-colonial periods and until
losing the West Bank in the Six-Day War of 1967, believed that
only the pan-Arab state encompassing all of the Arab-speaking
107

See, e.g., Griff Witte, Amid Terrorism fears in Europe, are security
forces
going
too
far?,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
14,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/amid-terrorism-fears-in-europeare-security-forces-going-too-far/2014/12/14/04ff60bc-742a-11e4-95a8fe0b46e8751a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c92b9ddb52b0
(discussing fighters returning from Syria and “policies fail to distinguish
between hardened extremists who pose a legitimate threat to the West and those
who travel to Syria for . . . humanitarian concerns”); Sebastian Rotella, How
Europe Left Itself Open to Terrorism, PBS (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-europe-left-itself-open-toterrorism/ (pointing to systemic issues such as differences in laws and security
cultures, fragmented databases, and limited resources); PETER R. NEUMANN,
PRISONS AND TERRORISM RADICALISATION AND DE-RADICALISATION IN 15
COUNTRIES
25,
28,
31
(2010),
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Prisons-and-terrorism-15countries.pdf (highlighting how prisons can play a role in radicalizing people).
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Hashemi, supra note 84, at 39.
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lands could be a real nation-state.110 Tibi adds that the defeat in
the Six-Day War gave rise to political Islam as the greatest
challenge to pan-Arabism and the secular nation-state system.111
Thus, while oil and Israel are unarguably basic priorities, it
is the lack of sustainable political and legal structures that allows
the multi-level conflicting interests to be born and to flourish—
interests from players supporting the existing nation-state structure,
versus those seeking to alter it and gain control over the region.
The players are not only internal, but also regional and global
because it is clear that foreign policies from regional and global
players exacerbate and promote radicalism, both directly and
indirectly, depending on what those regional/global players believe
would best serve their interests. This is an unsustainable status—
there will be a time when force, whether militant at one extreme or
a conflict between global powers at the other, will become
uncontrollable.
1. Current State and Legal Structure Invites and Harbors
Numerous Conflicting Interests
Attempts by Arabic-speaking nations at establishing
regional agreements have failed112 in turn resulting in
fragmentation that, combined with weak statehoods, has supported
Israel’s Likud’s belief in its supremacy and its continuing
intransigence.113 In addition, arguably in response, many Middle
Eastern governments have used the Arab-Israeli conflict to
institutionalize ‘national security’ as a top priority and to relegate
all other social and political problems, including ecological

110

Id. at 192.
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112
Id. at 198–99 (citing such as attempts as the Cairo Agreement and
more recently the Damascus Declaration Group); see also Justus R. Weiner, CoExistence Without Conflict: The Implementation of Legal Structures for IsraeliPalestinian Cooperation Pursuant to the Interim Peace Agreements, 26 BROOK.
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degradation, gender, race, class inequalities, abuses of human
rights, and attacks on cultural identities, to lower statuses.114
The focus on national security is one explanation for a rise
and exacerbation of conflicting interests and the growth and
consistency of terrorism as a method by the non-established state.
Conditions that can lead to terrorism include: the United States’
interests in preventing democracies l; fundamentalist Muslims
looking to establish Islamic states; Syrians seeking to regain lost
territories; and other regional powers seeking to further their
political goals. One factor contributing to Middle Eastern-rooted
terrorism, is the desire to lay claim on land—e.g. Syria and
Palestine are Muslim countries interested in establishing Islamic
rule, and Israel is a Jewish state, interested in laying claim to the
region and imposing its values.115 Thus, terrorism in the region is
about controlling the land and what words are instituted into that
state’s legal code regarding its religious identity.
Therefore, to resolve Middle Eastern conflicts there must
be consideration of attempts to lay claim to the other lands, along
with the attempts to impose religious and ethnic values. Further
inquiry on whether the current political structure: (1) gives rise to
or supports the conflicting interests; (2) is too fragile to support
these conflicting interests; and (3) fails to satisfy the interests of
religious identities and interests should be done.
The borders between Syria, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and
Jordan force these states to have conflicts rather than to favor
cooperation, because each state’s interests outweigh the common
interests among the other four states. For instance, Syria has
historically been unwilling to recognize Israel as a state, and has
supported groups like Hezbollah, which threaten Israel’s
security.116 As a result, Israel, who seeks security, will not return
Syria’s territories, currently occupied by Israel.117 Therefore,
114
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115
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interests in establishing security and in regaining land have
substantially outweighed interests in cooperation as evidenced by
continual disagreement, insecurity, and covert operations.
In addition, there are conflicts within each of the five states
arising from oppressive governments and lack of economic
leadership and development.
For example, Syria’s Sunni
population, as demonstrated by the Syrian rebelling forces
opposing its government and Syria’s civil war, has become
unwilling to continue under Assad’s Alawite government.118
Lebanon struggles internally to build a sustainable coalition
between its primary religious groups – Muslim Sunnis, Muslim
Shiites, and Christians.119 Moreover, Israel struggles to reconcile
with its non-Jewish Palestinian population.120 Thus, the current
political structure has been promoting conflicts because the
structure promotes insecurity.
Furthermore, these five states lack legal structures that can
meet security and land interests because each of these states has
been able to serve the interests of only a portion of its population
but not the whole. The internal conflicting interests also give rise
to regional conflicting interests and global conflicting interests.
Regional powers each have interests that overlap with certain
factions within the five states, leading to economic as well as
military support to those factions; for example, Saudi Arabia has
an interest in supporting Sunni groups, while Iran has interest in
supporting Shiite groups. Global powers choose sides and also
support regional powers aligned with the interests of that global
power. In the conflict between Syria and Israel, for example, Syria
appears to receive military and strategic support from Iran and

Minister Netanyahu in discussion with U.S. National Security Advisor John
Bolton, “When you are [in Golan Heights], you’ll be able to understand
perfectly why we will never leave the Golan Heights”).
118
See, e.g., Golan Heights Profile (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842.
119
See Han Il Chang & Leonid Peisakhin, Building Cooperation among
Groups in Conflict: An Experiment on Intersectarian Cooperation in Lebanon,
63 AM. J. POL. SCI. 146, 148 (2019).
120
See Raphael Cohen-Almagor & Mohammed S. Wattad, The Legal
Status Of Israeli-Arabs/Palestinians in IsraeL, 1 GNLU LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1,
1-5 (2019).
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Russia,121 while Israel appears to receive various forms of support
including diplomatic and military support, from the United States
and in prior years from Turkey.122 Lebanon’s Hezbollah, in its
struggles against Israel, receives support from Iran.123 In sum,
each internal party has at least one regional ally as well as some
global support.
In summary, the current political structure promotes
conflict, while the five states continue to lack a legal structure that
supports cooperation. The conflicts only grow as the conflicts
reach regional and global states. The five states cannot handle
internal conflicts because these states exist under the premise that
the other is illegitimate. Each of the five states lacks the legal
structure to support all of its populations and any inter-state
cooperation, and thus to handle internal conflicts.
2.

Marriage of Church and State

The paramount issues in the Middle East with regards to
stability revolve around the religious and ethnic conflicts.124 The

121
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Allies,
BUS.
INSIDER,
(Feb.
18,
2017,
10:00
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-israel-allies-2017-2;
Isabel Kershner,
Israel and Turkey Agree to Resume Full Diplomatic Ties, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/27/world/middleeast/israel-andturkey-agree-to-resume-full-diplomatic-ties.html (noting that “Turkey was once
Israel’s closest friend in the Muslim world, and the two countries still share
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See Myers, supra note 116, at 310.
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nation-state is by definition secular.125 Israel likely violates this
notion since it defines itself as a Jewish State in its Basic Law.126
Other ruling powers in the Middle East use Islam to legitimize
their secular rule and to counter-forces that challenge this
legitimacy.127 Islamic fundamentalism’s goal of establishing an
Islamic State cannot be shaken, and their inclusion within state
institutions is unlikely to change their world view in part due to
pursuing order based on divine worldviews.128
The Israeli marriage of religion with the state is not
necessarily supported by the majority of Jewish Israelis.129
Further, the Zionist movement has taken a step beyond the
marriage of religion and state in considering Judaism a race, a
notion that certainly is not universal among the rest of the Jewish
community and has offended emancipationist Jews.130 Zionist
leaders required conformism, which led to bullying tactics against
non-compliant Jews.131 Zionist leaders and Israeli politicians have
interpreted support for practical Zionism as a Jewish obligation, as
necessary for Jewish survival, and even as national liberation for
Jews.132 The Israeli High Court in 1971 affirmed that “there is no
Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation . . . composed not
only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry.”133
Unfortunately, this Zionist ideology creates an unwanted
and unhelpful barrier between those of the Jewish faith and their
neighbors.134 The creation of a race identity for those of the
Jewish faith encourages stereotyping and seeks to provide a
125
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Basic Law: Human Dignity, supra note 33; see Dugard & Reynolds,
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religion from state, YNETNEWS.COM (Sept. 18, 2017, 7:53 PM),
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scientific basis for discrimination, in contradiction to international
efforts that seek to combat racism.135
By the same token, fundamental Islamists allege Sharia is
divine; thus, Islamic Sharia is incompatible with the nation-state
model because it stands in contrast to popular sovereignty, in turn
making political Islamism and democracy incompatible.136 For
instance, Islam is a religion and not a concept of order or political
structure, and, as such, the concept of Islamic State is rather an
expression of a revolt against the Western-led nation-state and the
ruling Middle Eastern class.137 Islamic Sharia has an expansive
substantive reach that permeates public and private life, creating
the additional challenge of treating non-Muslims as subjects with
inferior political, legal, and religious rights.138 More troubling is
that institutional fundamentalism is more dangerous than terrorism
“because its followers act within the system and are in a position to
remake the existing order” without substantial resistance and
without resorting to violence or force.139
Some sources of outside support for fundamentalist
movements are current fundamentalist regimes in the region—Iran,
Sudan, Saudi Arabia—as well as the international fundamentalist
network as a logistical support system developed in Western
Europe.140
The current political structure in the Central Middle East
encourages conflict in large part because policies and interests in
each of the five states, and each movement within the states,
oppose fundamental claims, such as the existence of Israel or the
Alawites being in the government seat. A Jewish state by
definition cannot tolerate Islamic Sharia in its code; neither can a
proclaimed secular Syria. Thus, the continuation of the marriage
of church and state in the Central Middle Eastern states blocks any
135
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roadmap towards cooperation and co-existence between the area’s
peoples and governments. As such, this marriage must be removed
as part of a larger political and legal structure in order to subdue
the instability and address the conflicting interests.
3.

Economics

After the oil boom in the 1970s, Middle Eastern economies
shifted from being agricultural and textile markets to being
primarily single commodity exporters, primarily exporting oil.141
Meanwhile, most of these countries have resisted reform in
business organization and continue to place roadblocks against
business creation, arguably because new business, particularly
small businesses, generally lead to a rise in the middle class, where
a middle class would likely create pressures for democratic
reforms.142 Incumbent ruling elites oppose economic development
when it is likely to lead to social change that threatens the rulers’
hold on power.143 Another indication of the lack of economic
development is that Arabic-speaking states have the fewest trade
arrangements in the world and have not integrated into the
international economic community.144 Moreover, border politics
between the Central Middle Eastern countries, along with Iraq,
complicate and stagnate existing trade.145
Another issue is the dislike of Western policies, particularly
those of the United States, which “prevents reform because market
liberalization is branded as western cultural imperialism.”146
“Universalization is the acceptance of one set of cultural norms
and values,” whereas globalization refers to economic
interdependence; it is Western universalization that Islamists
oppose.147 In addition, tensions and conflicts with Israel, along
141
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with the war on terror, have slowed trade relations with western
countries.148
Middle Eastern countries with external threats, such as
Lebanon and Israel, permit new businesses to open because growth
is needed in order to generate the resources necessary to provide
security.149 On the other hand, countries with few external threats,
such as Syria, have had weak incentives to generate growth or to
tolerate political dissent.150
Thus, the current political structures in the five states have
either intentionally hindered economic development through
policies of isolation, or have supported economic development as a
means to finance the battles against insecurity and opposing
movements. In short, none of the five states have been able to
encourage economic development and ties with other states solely
for the goal of economic development. In turn, the lack of
economic development for its own benefits continues to support
rhetoric from fundamentalist groups and leaders. Thus, the five
states are in need of legal structure and policies that: (1) support
development; and (2) do so for the sake of development and not for
the sake of propagating the status quo.
B. Internal Interests: Central Middle Eastern Countries, and
Why it is this Political Structure—Between Syria, Jordan,
Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon—That Must Be Addressed
At the core of the issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The issue itself is probably best described in terms of control.
Israel looks to control the area, likely looking for a safe haven for
those of the Jewish faith. This is easily taken to an extreme,
however, when there is no neutral legal foundation. Israel's Basic
Law declares that Israel is a Jewish State.151 Furthermore, Israel
incorporates into its legal foundation entities such as the Jewish
National Fund, whose mission is specifically to preserve land for
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the betterment of those of the Jewish faith.152 On the opposite end,
are the those of the Islamic faith, particularly Arabic-speaking
Muslims, whose mission is to declare every state in the region a
Muslim-Arab State.153
Simply stated, those of the Jewish faith want the land to be
ruled by Judaism, and those of the Muslim faith want the land to be
ruled by Islam. This concept expands in the extreme direction with
every inch granted. It is such an approach and attempt at control
that Middle Eastern states and peoples must thwart. The moderate
voice is lost in between the turmoil, and effectively is either forced
to join or remains silent for fear of retribution.
The land is not Jewish, Muslim, or Christian. Whether
such was the case in the past, or whether such approach was
effective in the past, is not as relevant. It is not working for today's
societies; moreover, the international community has reached a
consensus against such an approach. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International
Convention on Elimination of All Form of Racial Discrimination
both recognize non-discrimination as a right.154 A legal foundation
that includes religion, ethnicity, or a defined group in its code, is
152
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inherently discriminatory and is inclined to lead to hegemony.155
Moreover, considering a land belonging to a faith or a person is
counter to every one of these religions because such an approach
obstructs human growth. Such labeling under the guise of the
betterment of humanity encourages one path to overpower another,
thus, promoting its existence and growth while hinders all others.
Palestinians and Jewish Israelis alone cannot solve the
issue, history and the present times profess as much.156 The two
groups have found it near impossible to come to any sustainable
terms within the past sixty years or so, arguably because of
competing and contradictory terms. The Oslo agreement was
difficult to reach, and has proven to be more difficult to
implement. The Palestinians argue that they made too many
concessions and that the agreement was biased towards Israel and
Israel's interests;157 yet, even with such bias, the two sides have not
been able to make its terms come to fruition. There must be
different circumstances that meet the interests of both sides.
Further, both sides must concede certain points, particularly the
attempt at full control along ethnic or religious lines.
1.

Israel’s Interests

The Israeli government has maintained that Israel is a
Jewish state.158 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu included in a
155
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2011 speech that the Jewish people have been exposed to an
agonized odyssey through the centuries and that they finally have a
home.159 In sum, the paramount interest of those in the Jewish
faith is security and peaceful living.
Studies on the opinions of Jewish Israelis shed light on the
status of these interests, whether it be the interest of peaceful
living, or the more guarded aspiration of propagating Israel as a
Jewish state and expanding its current borders. Bar-Tal and
Halperin reported on studies that show amongst Jewish Israelis a
high level of fear of being attacked.160 In 1999, Beres argued that
Israel was under an ever-higher existential threat due to the
combination of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the continued Arab/Islamic enmity towards Israel.161 In 2006,
Mnookin noted that more than 1000 Israelis and 3000 Palestinians
had died between the collapse of the Oslo process and 2006,
pointing to ‘profound internal conflicts’ between Jewish Israelis
and Palestinians.162 Israel has also had conflict and attacks from
Lebanese factions near its northern border, such as in 2000 when
Hezbollah attacked and killed seven Israeli soldiers, to which Israel
responded with air strikes.163 Thus, it is arguable that Jewish
Israelis have not acquired the desired status of peaceful living in
Israel-Palestine. This is likely a result of a combination of factors:

https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2011/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_Shana_Tova_world_JewrySept_2011.aspx.
159
See id. (“Palestinians finally have to recognize . . . that Israel is the
Jewish state. That the Jewish people, after all their travails, after all their
agonized odyssey through the centuries deserve their one and only place under
the sun - in the land of Israel, the State of Israel").
160
Bar-Tal & Halperin, supra note 81, at 22–23; see also Yossi Klein
Halevi, Israel’s Options in a Chaotic Middle East, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2016,
1:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/israels-options-in-a-chaotic-middleeast-1456512527.
161
Louis René Beres, Israel After Fifty: The Oslo Agreements,
International Law and National Survival, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 27, 27 (1999).
162
Robert H. Mnookin, et al., Barriers to Progress at the Negotiation
Table: Internal Conflicts Among Israelis and Among Palestinians, 6 NEV. L.J.
299, 299 (2006).
163
Adir Waldman, Clashing Behavior, Converging Interests: A Legal
Convention Regulating a Military Conflict, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 249, 250 (2002).

39

332

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 31:2

anti-Semitism, Middle Eastern politics and the fundamentalist
pursuit of Islamic statehoods.
Overall, Israel's overarching interest is that the Jewish
population lives and thrives peacefully and without fear. Israel’s
interests are best accomplished when surrounding states accept
those of the Jewish faith as being members of the region, as having
a role in the region's direction, and as members of governing and
decision-making bodies.
2.

Palestine’s Interests

The primary interest for Palestinians is arguably
autonomy—self-determination—through
statehood,
which
164
The Palestinians
Palestinians claim under international law.
sought for years the return of land, the entirety of what is today
largely accepted as Israel.165 They have in large part given up on
such a goal, and have settled on the European concept of the twostate solution, resting their claim on the boundaries recognized by
the Security Council.166 Self-determination is a second key interest
for Palestinians because Israel controls natural resources in the
Occupied Territories and exports, controls development through
permits, controls Palestinian entrepreneurial activity that may
compete with Israeli businesses, and controls Palestinian
schooling.167
In pursuit of self-determination, the Oslo agreement was
the first agreement between Israel and Palestinians that recognized
Israel as a state and Palestinians as a people with the right to a
state.168 The Palestinian Liberation Organization agreed with
164

See Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Recognition of
Palestinian Statehood: A Clarification of the Interests of the Concerned Parties,
40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341, 346 (2012).
165
Cf. id. at 378–79 (citing Israeli laws, including Absentee Property
Law of 1950, that deny absentee Palestinians citizenship and rights to properties
inside Israel).
166
See id. at 345 (stating that the Security Council must recognize the
boundaries for any claim).
167
Id. at 380.
168
See Avi Shlaim, The Oslo Accord, 23 J. PALESTINE STUD. 24, 25
(1994) (“[The Oslo Accord] was the first agreement between the Palestinians
and Israel since the creation of the State of Israel.”).
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Israel, on certain terms, that the West Bank and Gaza would
eventually be Palestine; however, this was conditioned on future
negotiations and were achievable only when the parties reach a
final settlement agreement.169 At the same time, Israel continues to
object to Palestinian statehood.170 There are many Palestinians
who refuse such an agreement and reject the recognition of Israel
when Israel is unwilling to recognize Palestine as a state.171
Palestinians also point to Israelis who confiscated hundreds of
thousands of acres of Palestinian land illegally.172 The question
then becomes whether the return of any of these lands viable. If
not, the question then becomes whether self-determination through
statehood within Oslo geographical boundaries is viable.
Israel has been reluctant to settle issues that would lead to
reaching a final status agreement, thus, acting to block Palestinian
independence.173 On the other hand, while Palestinian statehood is
not universally recognized, 137 states have recognized the State of
Palestine as of late 2018.174 The remaining states, including Israel,
take the position that statehood can only be established through
direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National
Council.175
169

Id. at 361.
See id. at 361 (describing Israel’s unwillingness to adopt the
constitutional guidelines of Resolution 181).
171
See Hassan Jabareen, Why Palestinians Can’t Recognize a ‘Jewish
State,’ HAARETZ (Sept. 2, 2011, 2:22 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/1.5163334
(“For the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish State is to declare their
surrender, meaning, to waive their group dignity by negating their historical
narrative and national identity.”).
172
Zena Tahhan, Israel’s settlements: 50 years of land theft explained,
AL JAZEERA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2017/50years-illegal-settlements/index.html (explaining that there is an estimate of
600,000 to 750,000 illegal Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories).
173
Nagan & Haddad, supra note 164, at 361.
174
Jason Lemon, Which Countries Recognize Palestine? Colombia
Becomes 137th U.N. Member to Do So, Newsweek (Aug. 10, 2018, 12:30 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/which-countries-recognize-palestine-colombiabecomes-137-un-member-1068318; see MPs back Palestinian statehood
alongside Israel, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/ukpolitics-29596822.
175
Ilene R. Prusher, Israel rejects Palestinian statehood bid via the UN,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Nov.
15,
2009),
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Some Palestinians consider Israel a colonial power with no
right to most of the properties many of its citizens currently
hold.176 This is all without beginning to consider Jewish
settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
By the same token, Israel has consistently violated nearly
every Fourth Geneva Convention protection.177 Israeli officials
have sought to affirm a Zionist manifest destiny while denying any
responsibility or accountability for the negative consequences of
the 1948 war.178 Picket’s commentary to the Fourth Geneva
Convention notes that the Convention included the prohibition of
civilian settlement in an occupied territory “to prevent the
occupying power from colonizing a territory for political and racial
reasons.”179
Thus, Palestine’s interest in self-determination opposes
Israel’s interests in control. Oslo has arguably been unsuccessful
because it has failed to negotiate terms that satisfy both interests;
however, the blame cannot be on the Oslo effort, but rather on the
extreme and opposing interests. Moreover, the current approaches
of control on one end and self-determination on the other are too
conflicting and only exacerbate each side. This is because the
implication is one side having to completely give up its interests,
as opposed to negotiating elements of those interests. In summary,
the Palestinian primary interest is self-determination. This is
clearly in conflict with Israeli interests of having access beyond
Israel proper and evident in Israel’s unwillingness to stop and
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1115/p01s01wome.html/%28page%29/2.
176
See Tahhan, supra note 172 (explaining that the Israeli colonies in
the occupied Palestinian territories involve seizing Palestinian land and are all
illegal under international law). “Munir Nuseibah, a law professor at al-Quds
University in Jerusalem, says the occupation and the settlement project
‘reminded the world of the colonial aspects of Israel.’” Id.
177
Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 65, 68 (2003) (quoting Allegro
Pacheoco, Flouting Convention: the Oslo Agreements, in THE NEW INTIFADA:
RESISTING ISRAEL’S APARTHEID 181, 184–85 (Roane Carey ed., 2001)).
178
Id. at 70.
179
John Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid in Occupied Palestine: A
Rejoinder to Yaffa Zilbershats, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a3partheid-in-occupied-palestine-a-rejoinder-to-yaffazilbershats/.
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remove settlements in the West Bank.
3.

Syria’s Interests

Syria has maintained a posture of war towards Israel by not
recognizing it as a State and continuing to build its army in
anticipation of a conflict, or possibly in deterrence.180 Syria has
also maintained its claim to the Golan Heights and its demand that
Israel relinquish its occupation of the territory.181 At the same
time, the Assad regime has generally oppressed Syrians and
subdued certain factions, such as Sunnis and Kurds.182 The war
stance allowed the government to maintain emergency status for
over 40 years and oppressive security and intelligence forces as the
foundation for stability, which arguably prevented the country's
growth.
Syria's interests, however, are not well defined because the
government has maintained its hold on power as its first priority,
such that the population's multiple factions continue to have
differing interests, possibly contradictory in some instances.183
Thus, the discussion must address two levels: (1) Syria’s political
and national interests; and (2) the population’s interests.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in turn Syria’s
response, have in large part played a role in hindering Syria's
progress and directly, or by proxy, have arguably contributed to a
weak legal infrastructure. This is more evident in the face of the

180

See, e.g. Zack Beauchamp, How are other Middle Eastern counties
handling
the
conflict?,
VOX
(May
14,
2018,
10:20
AM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080074/israeli-palestinian-conflict-saudiarabia-iran-turkey-egypt-jordan-syria-lebanon (“The Syrian government is still
quite hostile to Israel. Syria is aligned with Iran, Israel’s greatest adversary in
the region today.”).
181
See id.
182
Polk, supra note 66 (explaining that both Assad regimes, since
1973, met opposition with heavy military action and did not allow challenge to
their rule).
183
See id. (“[B]eing an Alawi or a Christian or a Jew put people under a
cloud. So, for Hafez al-Assad, the secular, nationalist Baath Party was a natural
choice: it offered, or seemed to offer, the means to overcome his origins in a
minority community and to point toward a solution to the disunity of Syrian
politics.”).
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Syrian opposition groups and the Islamic State.184 Thus, the
analysis of Syria's interests must include its national interests, as
well as the general interests of the population as a whole in
addition to each of the several factions. The general interests of
the population include the overarching principles of stability,
economic development, equality, and the basic freedoms of speech
and religion.
Unfortunately, Syrians have not been able to establish these
general interests, which is most likely because of the oppressive
regime. It may have been unreasonable to expect the population to
attain these interests in the face of the government's hold on the
country, the government's pervasive intelligence and security
forces, and the government's military strength. It remains,
however, that Syria’s various factions, unlike groups in other parts
of the Middle East, have shown they can co-exist.
To oppose the government’s oppressive hold, certain
Syrians appear to have accepted assistance from outside powers
such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. As for the
Islamic State, it is a generally accepted assertion that IS is not, and
was not, Syrian.185 Granted, there may be some in Syria who look
for Islamic statehood; however, there is no indication that such
individuals or groups constitute any substantial numbers.
Thus, generally, Syria’s interests are comparatively
simple—the return of occupied territories, stability, and economic
development. Further, Syria’s factions have historically shown
they can and want to co-exist.186 While there is the argument that
its government dictated such co-existence, interference from
outside powers remains to be a greater danger because of the
184

Cf. Kamal Alam, Why Assad’s Army Has Not Defected, NAT’L INT.
(Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-assads-army-hasnot-defected-15190 (arguing that Syria in fact has shown a resilient military
structure due to its ethnically integrated army and political structure).
185
See CNN Library, ISIS Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:07 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html
(explaining
that the Islamic State started as an al Qaeda splinter group and aims to create an
Islamic state called a caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond).
186
Guide to the Syrian opposition, BBC (Oct. 17, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15798218 (“In November 2012,
Syrian opposition factions agreed to set up a new and more inclusive leadership
council at a meeting in Doha, Qatar.”).
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likelihood and the trend that such interference would incite strife
and radicalization. The Islamic State is a prime example. As such,
Syria’s paramount interest is to prevent radicalization, and to reestablish stability and security. Stability will likely require
rebuilding the government in such a fashion as to also support and
promote economic development and equality, recognition of
human rights, and employment of democratic principles.
4.

Lebanon

Lebanon has had internal conflicts, and arguably continues
to do so, as well as interfering interests from its two neighbors,
Syria and Israel. Over almost four decades and through various
agreements and legal structures, there have been several attempts
to resolve the conflicts. The Lebanese Constitution, for instance, is
unique in the region in that it recognizes the various religious
groups187 and acts as one attempt to create cohesiveness and order.
An example of the inexplicable internal conflicts is the
fighting among the Lebanese Christians, forging alliances with
other communities against rival Christians.188 The Lebanese civil
war began in the mid 1970’s; subsequently, then-president
Suleiman Frangieh requested military assistance from Syria and
Syrian forces entered the country in 1976.189 Rather than being
neutral, Syrian forces supported partisan factions.190
In 1989, leaders of various Lebanese groups finally reached
an agreement with Syria, known as the Taif Agreement,
proscribing transitional Syrian withdrawal by 1991; however,
contrary to the agreement, Syrian forces remained in the country
until 2005.191 During its presence through 2005, Syria interfered in
Lebanese politics and controlled its elections, presidential
187

See generally John J. Donohue, s.j., Changing the Lebanese
Constitution: A Postmodern History, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2509 (2009)
(presenting background of communitarian and constitutionalism in Lebanon).
188
Alexandra R. Harrington, Resurrection from Babel: The Cultural,
Political, and Legal Status of Christian Communities in Lebanon and Syria and
Their Prospects for the Future, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 217, 218 (2006).
189
Tammam Kaissi, Invalidating the Orontes River Treaty in the
Context of Middle Eastern Politics, 26 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 176 (2014).
190
Id.
191
Id.
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nominations, and appointments.192 In that period, Syria claimed
military and economic interests in Lebanon, and also used attacks
by Hezbollah on Israel as a bargaining tool to regain the Golan
Heights from Israel.193 Syria, along with Iran,194 has supported
Hezbollah against Israel.
As the southern neighbor, Israel is another broker with
which Lebanon has had to contend. Israel began military
intervention in southern Lebanon in the 1960s in response to
attacks from Palestinian guerrilla groups in the area.195 Eventually,
in 1982, Israeli forces reached Beirut in a major military offensive
to drive out the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and then
remained in the southern parts bordering Israel until 1985.196
Israel completely withdrew in 2000.197
In 1997, Lebanon engaged with both Israel and Syria to
reach an agreement that addressed the rules of conduct under
which the Israeli-Lebanese conflict would continue.198 The United
States and France were also present.199
The agreement allowed both Syria and Israel to perpetuate
the conflict in a controlled fashion.200 Hezbollah’s attacks on
Israel in 2000 are an example of the then continued conflict, where
Israel responded with air strikes.201 By the same token, while it
was Hezbollah that executed the attacks on Israel’s northern
border, Israel had in fact to contend with Syria.202 It was

192

Id. at 177.
Waldman, supra note 163, at 254.
194
See Dan Williams, Iran's allies, not atoms, preoccupy Israeli
generals, REUTERS, May 5, 2015, 9:56 AM, https://www.reuters.com/article/usiran-nuclear-israel-allies/irans-allies-not-atoms-preoccupy-israeli-generalsidUSKBN0NQ1CC20150505; Israeli military official says Hezbollah
stockpiling weapons, YNETNEWS.COM (May 13, 2015, 8:24 PM),
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4657064,00.html
(noting
the
Iranian-backed militant Hezbollah group’s weapons were bought in Syria).
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Waldman, supra note 163, at 253.
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Id. at 254.
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Id. at 252.
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questionable whether the attacks and the responses abided by the
1997 agreement.
Israel remains, at the minimum, concerned about Hezbollah
and Hezbollah receiving support from at least Iran.203 Internally,
Lebanon continues to be divided along sectarian and ideological
lines while experiencing spillover from the Syrian conflict.204
Thus, Lebanon’s interests are two-fold. First, an internal legal and
political structure that can address the divisions between the
different factions, without political or military interference from its
neighbors. Second, stability in its neighbors that allows for
collaboration and prevents the need to use Lebanon as a battle
ground or as a proxy.
5.

Jordan

Interests of Jordanians, and arguably Jordan as a state,
revolve around democratization and its economy. Although
favored, democratization in Jordan is likely difficult without
regional, legal support, primarily because Jordan is constitutionally
a Muslim state, such that its king being Muslim is a constitutional
requirement.205 Such requirements are likely to collide with
democratic principles, and changes to them would likely face
strong opposition. Arguably, only a regional shift in polity and
legal structure, with incentives in promises of stronger economy,
203

See generally Williams, supra note 194 (describing the primary
concerns of Israeli defense ministers).
204
See generally Maeva Bambuck, Frequent lockdowns around
Lebanon parliament hurt businesses, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (May 13, 2015),
https://apnews.com/1908201d40d54406863f3d95dcecc100 (explaining how the
Syrian civil war impacts Lebanese businesses).
205
See Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or
Unofficially,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/10/03/many-countries-favor-specific-religionsofficially-or-unofficially/ (“In Jordan, for example, Islam is the state religion,
and converts from Islam to Christianity were occasionally questioned and
scrutinized by security forces in 2015. Non-Muslim religious groups must
register to be able to own land and administer rites such as marriage. They are
tax exempt, but do not receive subsidies. In contrast, the Ministry of Awqaf and
Islamic Affairs manages Islamic institutions, subsidizes certain mosquesponsored activities, pays mosque staff salaries and manages clergy training
centers.”).
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stronger human rights enforcements, and stronger regional
relationships, but without external cultural values, would defeat
such opposition.
Since 1989, Jordan has been a semi-democratic state—one
that “permit[s] more political competition than autocracies, but less
than democracies.”206 Social science shows that democratic
change that shifts Jordan to full democratic status would reduce the
risk of internal conflict.207 In addition, polls show that Jordanians
look favorably upon democratic governments.208 In 2011, over
70% of Jordanians surveyed indicated that “democracy is
preferable to any other kind of government;” moreover, in 2006,
more than 80% of Jordanians believed that democracy was the best
system of government “despite its drawbacks.”209 In regards to its
legal structure, Jordan’s Constitution combines Islamic law with
civil code adopted from European states, declaring Islam as the
state religion while also providing for freedom of religion with
certain limitations, such as prohibiting conversion from Islam and
requiring that the King be Muslim.210
Statistical analysis suggests that civil war and domestic
terrorism occurs more frequently in semi-democracies, such that
democratization in such states is likely to reduce the risk of
instability more quickly than in autocratic states.211 Syria, as an
autocratic government, may have been able to maintain social
peace through oppression; however, its capacity to long-term order
206

Jamie O'Connell, Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy
in Arab States Can Benefit the West, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 341, 361 (2012).
207
See id. at 362–63 (describing how democratic governments reduce
the risk of civil war).
208
Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-forrepresentative-and-direct-democracy/ (“A median of 27% in the Middle East
and North Africa are classified as committed to representative democracy. In
this region, Israelis (36%) and Jordanians (33%) are most likely to prefer
democracy to nondemocratic forms of government.”).
209
Id. at 351.
210
See Stephen S. Zimowski, Consequences of the Arab Spring: How
Shari'ah Law and the Egyptian Revolution Will Impact IP Protection and
Enforcement, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 150, 166 (2013) (describing the
Jordanian legal system).
211
O’Connell, supra note 206, at 361.
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through such means, as shown by its most recent internal conflict
that started in 2011, is questionable.212 In addition, Jordan, as well
as Syria and other Middle Eastern states, is a party to the ICCPR,
whose Article 25 provides, in part, the right to vote, to be elected at
periodic elections, and to free expression guarantee.213
Economically, Jordan would greatly benefit from stronger
ties, collaboration, and trade with its neighbors. Its landscape
being primarily a desert, Jordan lacks the natural resources to be
able to completely support its population and immigrants from
conflicts in neighboring states. Thus, Jordan has interests in
collaborating economically with its neighbors to help grow its
industries. History has shown that improved trade relations
markedly benefitted Jordan.214 Starting in 1999, Jordan has
applied a secular approach to international trade and political
relationships.215 This approach has resulted in more than doubling
Jordan’s GDP over a 10-year period from 1999 to 2010.216
Thus, interests of Jordanians arguably include
democratization and continued economic growth, both of which
are more likely to come to fruition with stronger ties with and
support from its direct neighbors.
C. Regional Interests: Regional Powers—Turkey, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar
Regional and neighboring countries such as Turkey and
Iran are becoming stronger militarily and economically.217 Turkey
has positioned itself in the recent past as an “order-creating” center
in the region, particularly after abandoning its efforts to join the
212

Id. at 360.
Id. at 352–53.
214
See, e.g., U.S. Relations With Jordan: Bilateral Relations Fact
Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.state.gov/u-s-relationswith-jordan/ (“The U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement (FTA), the U.S.’s first FTA
with an Arab country, has expanded the trade relationship by reducing barriers
for services, providing cutting-edge protection for intellectual property, ensuring
regulatory transparency, and requiring effective labor and environmental
enforcement.”).
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Zimowski, supra note 210, at 168.
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Id.
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See Tibi, supra note 10, at 196.
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European Union.218 It has, however, failed to become such a
force.219 Nonetheless, Turkey is considered as the “winner of the
Arab Spring” in that it is seen to “have played a constructive role”
in Arab events and as a model for governments in the region.220 In
addition, Turkey, specifically the Justice and Development Party
(AKP), recognizes its “strategic location between the Middle East
and Europe.”221
Equally important, Turkey also has interests in affecting
and preventing Kurdish populations from gaining power or
influence. Turkey has persistently demonstrated efforts to subdue
its Kurdish population; it has maintained a policy of military
opposition against the Kurds, particularly in the southeastern parts
of the country and bordering Syria.222 Syrian Kurds have gone as
far as to accuse Turkey of supporting the Islamic State in Syria
against the Kurds.223
Iran, on the other hand, has been more directly and openly
involved in Central Middle Eastern states and the area’s politics.
Iran has, and continues to, support Syria’s Assad regime,224
possibly to build strategic and religious ties considering Assad’s
Alawite’s background. Thus, Iran’s interests are arguably counter
218
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220
Halim Rane, The Relevance of a Maqasid Approach for Political
Islam Post Arab Revolutions, 28 J.L. & RELIGION 489, 508 (2013) (quoting
Shibly Telhami, The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll, BROOKINGS INST. &
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See id. at 510.
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See Desmond Butler & Suzan Fraser, Turkey onslaught on Kurds,
after IS attack, fuels anger, WASH. TIMES (July 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/30/turkey-onslaught-onkurds-after-is-attack-fuels-an/ (discussing Turkey’s actions and relations with
the Kurds and government parties); see, e.g., Akbar Shahid Ahmed, Obama Is
Letting Turkey Target The U.S.’s Best Bet Against ISIS, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
11, 2016, 5:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-kurdsturkey_us_56bcaeffe4b0b40245c57fcf (discussing Turkey’s ongoing violence
and relations with the Kurds, and Islamic-State attacks).
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NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33690060.
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to Turkey’s as each state brokers to maintain or gain influence in
the area.
Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also had interests in the area,
particularly to oppose Iran’s interests. Qatar and Saudi have
supported the rebels against the Assad regime225 and against Iran.
Moreover, it is clear that Qatar supports Syrian rebels against the
Syrian regime not for interests in democracy, but to support
establishing a Sunni state, and to oppose the Iran-friendly regime.
Saudi Arabia in particular has shown direct influence with
the conflict in Syria and the spread of Wahhabist Jihad.226 Garner
and McFarland hold Saudi Arabia responsible for a Wahhabist
jihad outside of Saudi Arabia’s geographic borders.227 They point
to “connections between Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist religious
establishment and the ideology sustaining worldwide Islamic
jihad.”228
In the 18th century, Wahhab created an unyielding form of
Islam, allowing “no room for diversity or disagreement.” 229 He
dedicated his life to Taymiyya’s militant message of jihad.230
Taymiyya was a “fourteenth-century Islamic jurist and scholar”
who believed that corruption of Islam occurred due to departure
from strict obedience to Islamic texts and “influences from
Christianity, Judaism, and paganism.”231 Taymiyya rejected the
notion that jihad was an optional aspect of Islam.232 Taymiyya
taught that preservation justified jihad, and authorized jihad in
defense of “the faith from external infidel forces” such as the
Mongol invasion and subjugation of the Middle East. He did not,
however, authorize jihad against other Muslims.233 Wahhab, on
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See Mohammed Al Jarman, The Intersection of Wahhabism and
Jihad,
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228
Id. at 227 (emphasis omitted).
229
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the other hand, moved a step further than Taymiyya and authorized
jihad against Muslims who were considered apostates.234
Wahhab’s tribe kicked him out for his style of fundamental
Islam; thereafter, Wahhab favored Muhammad ibn Saud, a local
tribal leader.235 Saud formalized his affinity for Wahhab in a pact
in which Saud adopted Wahhab’s ideology and agreed to protect
Wahhab and lead the effort to indoctrinate the Arabian
Peninsula.236 Muhammad ibn Saud, the patriarch of the House of
Saud in the eighteenth century, met with Mullah Wahhab in 1744
and cemented the political and religious relationship.237 The SaudWahhab pact dedicated the “Sauds to spreading and securing
Wahhab’s vision of Sunni Islam.” 238 At the time, the Ottoman
Empire did not directly control the interior of the Arabian
Peninsula, thus, allowing the local tribal leaders to emerge as
governing authorities.239 Saud’s influence outside his tribal
settlement was limited prior to his alliance with Wahhab.240 With
the support of Wahhabbi followers, the Saudi tribe was soon able
to subjugate all the neighboring tribes through a campaign of
killing and plundering.241 They used Wahhab’s vision to unite the
tribes under the rule of the House of Saud, paving the path to the
Saudi Kingdom’s birth in 1932.242 The conquest of the peninsula
came at a cost of 40,000 public executions and 350,000
amputations.243 Jihadists have since been using the same ideology
to wage religious war outside Saudi Arabia’s borders.244
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Today, Saudi Arabia does not recognize basic freedoms,
such as freedom of press, thought, or religious expression.245 The
only religious belief that the Kingdom has allowed throughout its
history has been Wahhab’s version of Sunni Islam.246 The
Kingdom’s religious police control the lives of Saudi subjects from
the day’s attire, to the manner and substance of prayers.247 The
United States State Department noted in a 2003 report that Mosque
preachers, paid and supervised by the state, continued violent antiJewish and anti-Christian preaching after 9/11.248 Moreover, the
Saudi Ministry of Education publishes and permits only ministryauthorized textbooks, all of which propagate the teachings of
Wahhab, and, further, bans any books authored by non-Wahhabi
educators.249 Thus, Saudi Arabia has instilled an intolerant version
of Islam that in present day, is resulting in Jihad throughout the
world.250
In summary, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in particular,
each have conflicting interests with each other, and in Central
Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey has interests in emerging as an
influential regional leader and in countering any Kurdish
stronghold. Iran has interests in supporting and maintaining ties
with Syria’s Assad regime and with Hezbollah against Israel.
Saudi has interests in opposing any Iranian influence in the area or
Iranian ties with the area’s governments and groups. Each of these
interests not only conflict, but also support and exacerbate internal
conflicting interests.
D. Global Interests: The Global Powers—United States,
European Union, Russia, China
The United States, along with other western powers, has
supported and preferred to work with authoritarian state structures
in the Middle East.251 Thus, the superpower and 1.4 billion
245
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Muslims stand locked in mutual suspicion, distrust, and anger.252
State structures in the Muslim world have been at best
unresponsive and incompetent when it comes to meeting public
need.253 In large part, the absence of public accountability and
deeply-rooted bureaucratic traditions of self-governance have
supported those state structures that result in corruption, patronage,
and clientelism.254
Although the United States continues to be a superpower, it
lacks the economic, political, and military capabilities to impose
rules and effect conflict resolution on a global scale.255 As such,
the United States supported authoritarian regimes that protected
United States interests from hostile forces, preferring political
stability over parliamentary democracy.256 As a result, the United
States suffers from a credibility gap in convincing regional
populations that it is serious about reform and democratization.257
The United States has supported democratization as long as there
was no clash with United States interests.258 Turkey is a prime
example, because it was a strong United States ally which
administrations praised as a model for Muslim majority societies,
until Turkey began to shift its foreign policy toward the IsraelPalestine conflict.259 In reality, citizens, including Arab-speaking
citizens and democratic leaders, are more likely to be reliable allies
in the long run than autocrats.260
The United States credibility gap is the culmination of the
United States frequently pulling back at the realization of what
reordering might mean to its short-term interests.261 For instance,
the United States considered the democratization in Palestine until
Palestinians voted for Hamas, where Hamas was considered likely
to counter United States’ short-term interests.262 Another dilemma
252
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is that the United States has duality in its policy and requests help
from the same regimes it hopes to change—including
organizations such as al-Qaeda.263 The September 11, 2001
attacks forced the United States to re-examine its policy towards
the Muslim world and the Arab-speaking Middle East.264 In
addition, lobby groups with their own agendas, such as the United
States-based Jewish groups in support of Israeli nationalism,
further complicate United States interests.265
On the other hand, Russia has provided financial and
military support to regimes not aligned with the United States,
particularly the Assad regime; China has also supported Assad’s
regime at least politically through Security Council vetoes.266
Syria, as a Central Middle Eastern state, has, thus, received support
from both Russia and China, where both have opposed intervention
in the Syrian conflict, considering states as masters of their own
internal affairs.267 Russia and China blocked a U.N. Security
Council resolution against Syria’s government and its use of lethal
force against protesters.268 China’s interests in the Middle East
have been incompatible with American interests, trading with and
providing technology and weapons to Syria and Iran.269
As for the European Union, the close proximity of Middle
Eastern countries to Europe generally makes the region an
important economic and political player with the European
Union.270 Europe also has immigration issues stemming from
Middle Eastern states. Thus, the European Union (“E.U.”) must
263

Id.
Hashemi, supra note 84, at 33.
265
See Nagan & Haddad, supra note 164, at 383–84 (commenting on
the lack of United States’ support in Israel).
266
See Nanda, supra note 224, at 19 n.83.
267
See Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf, Note, Modern Threats and
the United Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency (A Response to
Professor Allen Weiner), 62 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1414 (2010).
268
See Amy E. Eckert, The Responsibility to Protect in the Anarchical
Society: Power, Interest, and the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Syria, 41
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 87, 90 (2012).
269
Justin W. Evans, A New Energy Paradigm for the Twenty-First
Century: China, Russia, and America's Triangular Security Strategy, 39 IND. L.
REV. 627, 632 n.31 (2006).
270
Adal, supra note 144, at 63.
264

55

348

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 31:2

also grapple with the region, the region’s economic development,
and the region’s stability. The E.U. has various trade agreements
with Central Middle Eastern states, particularly Israel.271 The E.U.
has also attempted to broker peace in the Central Middle East on
various occasions.272 The Oslo Accords are a prime example.273
Thus, each of the global powers have interests in the region
and in the Central Middle East in particular. The United States has
had complicated interests throughout the region.274 Russia and
China have attempted to counter those interests to maintain their
influence globally and regionally.275 Europe has had to deal with
the political instabilities directly and indirectly through terrorism,
271
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immigration, and economics.276 These interests conflict because,
for example, the United States’ interests and interventions have not
lead to stability, and have in turn contributed to terrorism in and
immigration into Europe.
These interests of the global powers are connected and
intertwined with the regional interests and with the internal
interests. The United States has ties with Turkey and Saudi
Arabia, while Russia and China have ties with Iran.277 The United
States has also supported Saudi and Qatar’s indirect intervention in
the Syrian conflict, providing weapons and money, while Russia
provided the same to Syria’s regime.278 Thus, the internal interests
of each groups and Central Middle Eastern states have connections
to regional powers and global powers. Such a scheme is not
conducive to stability, but rather places groups and states at each of
the three levels at odds.
E. Results of the Intersection of Interests
Al-Qaida, ISIS/IS, and other such groups cannot be allowed
to grow. It is arguably in the world's best interest to achieve more
stability, particularly in the Central Middle East, because of the
multi-leveled interests. Unfortunately, global and regional powers
have not been able to reach common grounds. For example, the
United States has stated their interests are maintaining some
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oppression through autocratic regimes,279 with a sentiment among
Middle Eastern populations that the United States is opposed
political or economic progress in the region280. As a result, the
superpowers and the 1.4 billion Muslims continue to be locked in
“mutual suspicion, distrust, and anger.” 281 There are analyses on
the fears of allowing democracy in the Middle East, pointing
democratic forces opposing the interests of global-powers.282
These fears may be well founded; they should not, however,
translate to complete disregard of stability, peace, and progress.
It would be in all parties’ interest to enforce stability and
peace in the Central Middle East. Peace would have to be 'neutral'
in its form, such that it serves the interests of the local populations
and individual states, including Iran, Turkey, the United States, the
European states, Russia, and so on. One source of interest that is
not present, or known of, in the Central Middle East is oil.
Researchers have not tapped into any major oil reserves in any part
of these countries. Thus, stability in these countries would not
279
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come at the expense of oil-consuming countries. Rather, stability
in this area is likely to lead to better access to oil reserves in the
surrounding countries and even eventual higher production of
alternative energy sources including solar and wind.
The United States, European Union, and Russia, are all
allowing the conflict to continue. The United States arguably,
through its foreign policy and stance towards Israel, the European
Union, through its economic ties with Israel, but inability to
contribute to economic growth in the other 4 states, and Russia,
with its counter-interests to those of the United States and with its
stance with Syria.
The United States supports Israel, while other states
encourage Israel to adjust its approach to Palestinian rights.283
Palestinians have a cause for which to fight, and for Arab states
and Islamic populations in general to believe in, when Palestinian
rights are ignored. Arab states, such as Syria, have used this cause
283
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to build its military for years; the same is true for Iran.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to have interests in countering
western pervasiveness and in maintaining an ally in each of Syria
and Iran. The goal of these opposing approaches is to serve and
propagate each interest, rather than build a long-term vision for
stability. Thus, the self-serving focus is perpetuating conflict,
instability, violations of human rights, terrorism, mass
immigrations, local and proxy wars, and increasing risks of major
regional and global conflicts.
IV. FEDERALISM
A fundamental issue in federalism is balancing central
authority and state autonomy.284
The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1969) describes federalism as
“a form of government in which a union of states recognizes the
sovereignty of a central authority while retaining certain residual
powers of government.”285 In American federalism, the residual
powers that states retain yields to a national standard in a given
area of law when the national standard forms a federal scheme that
is sufficiently comprehensive to occupy that area of law.286 As
such, American federalism has arguably succeeded in providing a
degree of regulatory variations across jurisdictions in regards to
overarching principles and direction.287 This occurs while member
states through Congress, and citizens through elections, have
maintained a form of political check on the power of the central
government.288
The Central Middle East legal structure requires
coexistence, and the ability to address internal and external
conflicting interests, in order to achieve stability. For instance, an
agreed-upon central authority in theory would have the incentive to
build cohesiveness between the member states and coexistence of
284
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their populations, as opposed to supporting separate internal
interests and continued inter-state conflict. A central authority
would also have the incentive to promote trade and economic
growth among the member states, from which all five potential
states would greatly benefit.
In regard to regional stability, the current political structure
has shown that it promotes conflict and armed competition
between the five neighboring states and their populations, rather
than cooperation and genuine attempts to coexist. This is evident,
as described in the prior sections, primarily because the current
structure does not serve the interests of each of the five states.
This allows the conflicts to continue and increase, and in turn leads
to competing regional and global interests that the five states
cannot handle. On the other hand, creating a legal foundation that
acts as an umbrella and a binding fabric is likely to also create a
primary and common interest among the five states that overrides
and undermines conflicting interests, while also promoting
negotiating power with regional and global interests.
The benefits of a federal system lie in its promotion of
unity and cooperation. For instance, these five states and their
populations would be better served by a common recognition
similar to the United States’ privileges and immunities, such that
an Israeli citizen visiting Syria would have the same protections in
Syria as a Syrian citizen. In addition, internal security interests
would also be better served because there would be one army
structure consisting of forces from all five states, protecting and
upholding the primary common interest of the five states, as
opposed to depleting resources on multiple competing armies to
ensure security. As for the global community, the United States
would not have to balance its interests between Arab-speaking
populations and the Jewish population because, theoretically, the
five states would have one foreign policy that foremost serves the
union. Similarly, Russia and China and, the European Union
would have less resistance particularly in regard to economic
relations, thus also serving its economic interests.
Naturally these are speculations, and, as the European
experience has shown, such an attempt is not without challenges.
Nonetheless, it is clear from history, from extreme and perpetual
security and political conflicts, that the current political structure is
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not conducive to co-existence. Uniting these five states under one
legal umbrella would directly address the reasons behind the
conflicts.
A. Proposed Structure
As an example supporting federalism, the United States
Constitution mandates that federal law preempts inconsistent state
law, with the Constitution being the highest law of the different
tiers of federal law.289 The European Union, as another example,
has a draft of a European Constitution, which incidentally and
unlike the United States, permits state withdrawal.290 Unlike the
EU, however, a union between these Central Middle Eastern states
would require stronger political unity that includes one military
and one foreign policy. Having one military is crucial to building
trust and indiscriminate security between these states and their
peoples. Additionally, having one military will also support and
promote economic development and growth.
As such, federalism, spearheaded by a federal constitution,
is “a tool for political integration in pluralistic societies,” and a
counter to majoritarian tyranny.291 Similar to Central Middle
Eastern states and societies, Professor Chibli Mallat of Saint
Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, points to Iraqi society and
argues that federalism is the one model that can offer respite for
Iraq’s communities to flourish. Professor Mallat points to Iraq’s
multiple dimensions of disunity—between Arabs and Kurds, and
Sunnis and Shiites, and notes that a federal Iraq must be thought
through the diversity and complexity of Iraq’s society.292
Federalism arguably corrects the model of unitary nation-state by
establishing an objective structure for social and political
organization, while the unitary nation-states have proven to
alienate either their minority populations (Israel) or their majority
289
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populations not in power (Syria) and lead to conflicts of ethnic
identities.293 Thus, broadly speaking, one strength of federalism is
that it offers greater opportunities for power-sharing, and reduces
the prospects of conflict by facilitating political participation.294
Another issue is the confusing, and arguably contentious,
definition of statehood. The international system defines a state as
one with geographical boundaries, laws, recognition by other
states, and a population. While each of these has the potential to
be contentious, it is the population aspect of the definition that is
most relevant to the argument at hand. That is, what group of
persons would constitute a population in the Middle East? For
instance, do those of the Jewish faith constitute a population, or
those who have lived within a given state boundaries for a
prolonged period regardless of religious practice and regardless of
lineage? Are the Kurds in Northeast Syria members of the Syrian
people, or must they continue to retain the 40-year refugee status?
How about the Armenians throughout the Central Middle East?
There is no indication that international customary law
limits ‘population’ by any definitions, such that there is no
relationship to ethnic or religious boundaries; however, we often
see that either those who come into power associate the state
definition to ethnicity or religion, or that a given sect in the
population perpetuates the association.
The multitude of peoples in the Middle East, of differing
religious practices, lineages, and origins, each tend to desire a
stake in governing the region. If Israel were not around, no doubt
the majority Muslim population would lean toward calling
Palestine a Muslim or Arabic State. After all, the majority of the
population practice Islam and speak Arabic. Certainly, the Arabic
speaking countries, most obvious examples being Qatar's and
Saudi's recent agendas, have attempted to establish the Arabic state
or some form of an Arabic union.
The definition of statehood is at the core of the issue and
today's struggles. In the Central Middle Eastern reality, a state
cannot abide or be limited by such limitations; rather, it must
uphold the interests of all those residing under its jurisdiction, as
293
294
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one people. Thus, in the context of statehood, and political
interests, all those residing under the state's jurisdiction must be
considered as one people, and must not attach a characteristic of a
given group of persons to the state itself.
B. Political Interests
Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
history proves that both sides are unwilling to consider their issues
of coexistence and both sides are ambivalent toward legal norms
that can affect solutions.295 This conflict affects their political
stability as well as the political stability of Syria, Jordan, and
Lebanon.
As discussed above, the conflict and the
uncompromising position on key points also draw sided support
from regional and global powers.
Similarly, in Syria and Lebanon, each has had its internal
interests as well as conflicts with their neighbors, where no
agreement thus far has achieved continued peace.
The
agreements, as with the Taif Agreement,296 have arguably
attempted to set rules for continued conflict, and not necessarily to
resolve the conflicts. While peace treaties between Israel and
Jordan have actually achieved some recognition, it remains to their
detriment that the lack of economic cooperation continues to reign
between the two neighbors.
To promote internal and inter-state security, political
stability, economic cooperation, and economic growth, there needs
to be at least some ties between the five states to highlight and
perpetuate common interests among these states. Federalism is the
one political structure that can create the foundation for building
such ties and for allowing the five states to advance their common
interests. Regional and global powers have shown they are not the
proper parties to promote these ties because their vision is
generally promoted by their own interests, in turn perpetuating the
conflicting interests and consistently causing a disservice to the
region and the global community.
The five states are more likely to cooperate with each other,
in particular in regard to security and political stability, when they
295
296
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are bound to each other and when their interests are tied. A federal
legal structure would act as that binding fabric, such that
cooperation would outweigh inter-state conflicts and competing
narrow internal interests.
While a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine is
unclear and may still be moving forward with Palestine unilaterally
and gradually moving to achieve full statehood, conflict and
violence are likely to continue because such a structure does not
serve the interests of either Israel or Palestine. Israel seeks control,
recognition, and security, while Palestine seeks political and
economic independence. With a Palestinian state, Israel loses
control, and arguably access, over the West Bank, and East
Jerusalem. These territories would likely continue to be a
contentious subject and a cause for violence from both sides. As
for the 150 or so settlements in the West Bank, removing them is
one possibility, but even then, violence is more likely to persist
from both sides, from Israelis unwilling to give up the land, and
from Palestinians in retaliation.
On the other hand, federalism along with the other three
Arabic-speaking states would better serve the interests of both
Israelis and Palestinians. While federalism would remove Israeli
control over the occupied territories, the new access to these lands
would likely mitigate this interest. Israelis would also be able to
live in those areas, albeit under Palestinian laws, but still under the
protection of federal laws. Such a status is more likely to serve
both sides than the current status. On the one hand, Palestinians
would have these areas under self-control and self-determination,
including control over natural resources and economic growth.
Palestinians would also be able to provide Israelis with access to
the West Bank, the option to remain in the West Bank, and
protection from a united force that includes Israelis and
Palestinians.
By the same token, federalism would also abate the conflict
between Israel and Syria because Israel would be assured security
from Syria, and access to the Golan Heights, while Syria would
retain the Golan Heights and discontinue its war-stance against
Israel. This also serves both Lebanon and Jordan simply through
political stability in and among their neighbors.
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There are those who would argue this is an impossibility,
and nothing more than a formula for exacerbating the violence;
however, it is the one method that can best serve or mitigate the
interests of all sides. Alternative methods, such as agreements, or
even attempts at peace talks and agreements, do not succeed or
often do not even reach a signatory step because the ultimate goals
of such talks cannot adequately serve any given party’s interests.297
For instance, talks between Syria and Israel have never reached a
milestone, most likely because of the positions regarding the Golan
Heights, and Lebanon continues to have internal conflicts while its
Hezbollah continues its strife with Israel.
Therefore, a federal structure between the five states would
serve the internal and inter-state political interests among these
five states, while also providing a platform to handle external
interests. Federalism arguably is more likely to provide the
foundation for stability and security than any agreement or attempt
thus far, because its aim would be to directly address each interest
that is giving rise to the conflicts.
C. Economic Interests
Federalism among the five states is also the necessary
foundation for economic growth in all five states. Generally, the
issue of establishing a regional order in the larger Middle East is
fundamental to addressing the conflicts in the region.298 Regional
economics contribute to building order, or causing chaos in the
face of stagnant conditions. For instance, the peace and relative
economic prosperity in Western Europe may be traced to European
countries eliminating trade barriers in certain sectors, which in turn
generated a degree of interdependence and order.299 Halabi, in
1997, argued that economic interdependence between countries in
the Middle East is the most effective means of maintaining peace
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and breaking the cycle of instability.300 Halabi cited Lubetzky,
arguing that economic cooperation would dampen animosities and
encourage coexistence and that nations at war without economic
relations have few shared interests to push them toward peace.301
The issue, then, is effecting such economic cooperation.
Thus far, the region in general has been trapped in a cycle
of “low growth, bad . . . governance, and resistance to economic
globalization.”302 The reason for such a cycle is arguably the lack
of a supporting legal structure. Economic policies require a legal
foundation, whether through internal policies or through inter-state
trade structures. Thus, while the mechanics of integration may rely
on economic policies, and free trade may help with solving the
region’s issues, political will is the driving force and the necessary
foundation and catalyst because it is political will that would create
the necessary legal structure to allow, support, and enforce the
mechanics of integration and economic policies.303
Government is necessary to provide the legal framework
Some common characteristics of
for entrepreneurship.304
successful economies include income equality, government
policies, political and economic freedoms, political stability, and
good governance.305
Halabi wrote that the obvious partner “to aid in
encouraging economic development and mutual economic
interdependence [in the Middle East] is the United States.”306
Unfortunately, discourse and agendas for democracy and free
market initiatives in the 1990s between the United States Agency
for
International
Development
and
non-governmental
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organizations did not extend to the Middle East.307 In addition,
local sectarianism continues to hinder productive economic
relationships.
Sectarianism, possibly summarizing the entire conflict in
general, blocks productive legal discourse and free market
initiatives. Cultural stereotypes, collective representations of
ancient blood-feuds, and religious conundrums help prevent legal
To dismantle
investigations and judicial intervention.308
sectarianism, the political and economic realities must be attended
to.309
A given state looking to promote growth must sacrifice
powers and reduce state and business interaction, thus allowing
business to thrive,310 while working to enforce overarching
principles. Principles, such as individuals’ rights and needs,
cannot continue to be secondary to communal needs; for instance,
the Jewish community’s rights and needs in Israel must be adhered
to while also not taking precedence over rights of non-Jews.311
Thus, building, deployment, application, and affirmation of law,
are crucial to resolving the problems of today’s Middle East.312
To be able to address the intersection of the numerous
interests, the five current states must fall under one legal umbrella,
one ‘federal’ constitutional foundation, while also affecting
equality, non-discrimination, and autonomy within the boundaries
of the larger federal legal umbrella and principles. Such a legal
umbrella is the one method to support and promote economic
cooperation and growth among the five states.
The European experience and experiment provides a useful
comparison.
The European powers and community likely
envisioned the European Union as a method to administer justice
and to regulate the internal market,313 as well as to create more
307
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leverage globally. However, Europe’s objectives appear to be
unclear, such that there appears to be only a general approach:
“more Europe” along with a goal of avoiding nationalism and a
promise of no superstate but without regard to whether common
policies create public bads and lead to wasteful public spending.314
Part of the issue may be that Europe needs to be a political union
when it is widely unclear what a political union is.315 One theory
is that a political union means linking the stabilization of financial
markets and public finances with Europeans—that is, with the
people—but without a dependency on the consent of national
governments.316 Another theory identifies a political union as one
having an integrated foreign policy, common defense, and
organized military, all of which the EU lacks.317
It is arguable that for the EU to succeed, Europeans, as
citizens of the EU, would have to recognize the benefits of
integration and accept that such benefits come with obligations,
including, for example, integration of a tax system.318 A similar
argument can be made for the Middle East; the difference,
however, is that arguably it is the Middle Eastern governments that
must reach such a recognition and admission.
Thus, the governments of the five states need to reach
consensus and recognition of their connected interests and the
benefits of creating political ties. Their economic interests are best
served by creating and building these political ties, which in turn
serves the interests of their populations and, at least in part, address
a cause of instability, insecurity, and terrorism.
D. Accountability to One Another
The five states must also become accountable to each other
first and foremost, before they are accountable to the international
community. This is especially true for discrimination, travel, and
security. Simply put, the five states, the state governments, and the
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proposed federal government, must become accountable to each
other and to their citizens—to the entire populous.
The United States sets a useful example, given that it is
arguably the only successful federal system with the large scale of
its population, land size, and ethnic diversity of its population.319
In the United States, laws are made through a comparatively
balanced process designed to be difficult, such that the actors in the
process are accountable to each other and to the people.320 The
United States structure achieves relative accountability through
substantive restrictions imposed by its Constitution, and procedural
restrictions imposed by the structural branches of both Houses of
Congress and the President.321 Substantive restrictions include
state protections and individual rights; while procedural rules may
apply to creating laws as well as enforcing them.322 Meanwhile,
the nation’s judicial branch, through the nation’s highest court,
plays a role in defining Congress’ substantive limits and has played
an even more prominent role in limiting Congress’ enforcement
powers.323 In comparison, the EU has not fared as well in regards
to accountability, as its Council’s decisions are made away from
the public eye, and the check on intergovernmental authority is
lacking.324
Certainly, Central Middle Eastern states have unique
issues, many of which are dissimilar from the United States and the
European challenges; nonetheless, the broad lessons of
accountability between one state government to one another, to
their respective peoples, and to the people in the area as a whole,
all apply. The United States structure provides ample lessons in
the usefulness of accountability, checks and balances, and
separation of powers. Arguably, the European experience provides
as much from which to learn.
319
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Moreover, because it is the governments who have failed to
reach the necessary agreements to achieve political stability, these
same governments cannot have access to military power of mass
destruction. In other words, unlike with the EU, the Central
Middle East requires one army, such that the five states would act
in unison in regard to threats, and would not have opportunities to
threaten one another. That army, however, must attain only limited
strength just enough to handle internal non-state forces and threats,
and maintain regional deterrence from opposing outside interests,
until at least a reasonable measure of political and economic
stability is achieved. Such a limitation would likely limit
aggression and would likely allow for more adherence to human
rights; for example, the limitation would include a ban against
weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, security against
regional intrusion or influence can come through leverage and
international agreements.
Therefore, accountability through the legal structure is
necessary to promote stability and to sustain the political and legal
union.
Such accountability must address property rights,
discriminatory practices, and disrespect of human life and
violations of humanitarian law, as well as issues of larger scale
such as a unified taxing system and military.
E. Risks
Risks are plenty with virtually any venture. In the case of
these five Middle Eastern states, there may be risks of one
particular state obtaining excessive control. Another is that of one
ethnic and religious majority leading to an imbalance in the
political structure. Yet another is the risk attached to centralization
and the creation of a superstate. It remains, however, that the risks
attached to creating a federal structure for the Central Middle East
are simply and clearly exponentially smaller than the risks and
issues attached to the current political structure.
A possible risk that the federal structure would have to
consider is one state acting more aggressively than the other states
to achieve its agenda and to meet its interests. Israel, for example
has historically taken such a stance, arguably to sustain its
existence. Such a stance, however, is likely to be a danger to
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achieving reasonable balance of political cohesion within a federal
structure.
As an example of Israel’s stance, consider Prime Minister
(P.M.) Netanyahu’s position on the Goldstone report of 2009.325
Prime Minister Netanyahu called the report biased and unjust and
asked the international community, “Will you stand with Israel or
will you stand with the terrorists? We must know the answer to
that question now. Only if we have the confidence that we can
defend ourselves can we take further risks for peace.”326 P.M.
Netanyahu's comment further signals Israel's stance, 'with us or
with terrorists?' proclaiming that there are only two sides, and that
P.M. Netanyahu’s perspective is the natural choice. Such an
approach cannot coincide with a federal structure. In other words,
there would need to be a commitment to the revised political
structure, to federalism, for federalism to survive. The lack of
commitment to federalism for its own sake have contributed to
failures of federal experiments elsewhere, such as with African
countries where federalism was perceived as a step toward
unification.327
There is also the danger of the international federal system
reducing the nation state to the format that market liberals find
desirable, at the expense of the rights of individuals.328 There is
the argument, for example, that an internationally-designed federal
system eliminates government bailouts for ailing industries
because there would not be sufficient popular support for aiding
one industry in a given region over another in a different region,
thus hampering social programs at the state level because of
widespread regulatory competition.329 On the opposite end is the
European experience, where there is an extensive effort to avoid
325
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the superstate and nationalism by strengthening the economic and
monetary union while democracy becomes a secondary goal.330
It is natural to have risks. However, risks can be managed
by acknowledging them and building structures to address them.
On the other hand, the current political lines in the Central Middle
East have proven to be irreconcilable with the interests of the
area’s populations, and continue to lead to violent conflicts,
regionally and globally. Thus, when the risks of exploring and
building a structure that addresses the root of the instabilities are
compared to the current ills caused by contemporary political lines,
these risks are minute in comparison. Risks attached to a possible
solution to an existing issue cannot be the reason for avoiding that
solution. Each of the risks considered above, as well as others that
are not mentioned, can be addressed. While some issues, such as
continued terrorism and radicalism, have become too pervasive
such that they are no longer just risks, these are social threats that
should not be tolerated. Allowing the current political lines to
continue is effectively allowing these threats to continue and grow.
Thus, the true risk is not in a federal structure as an attempt to
resolve the issues in the Middle East, but rather it is in allowing the
root reasons for the existing threats to continue.
It is in the best interest of all parties, internal, regional, and
global, that the Central Middle Eastern states have a vision and a
plan to establish stability. Federalism is arguably the best
approach because it has the potential to meet the primary internal
interests, the interests of warring groups, as well as those of each
state as a whole. In turn, stability in these states can also serve the
interests of regional and global powers because of the potential for
growth in economic cooperation without necessarily relinquishing
alliances. Thus, federalism is the one solution that can serve the
wide range of the conflicting interests, while also addressing the
current threats of radicalism and growing instability.
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED
Military alliances, such as the alliance between Syria and
Iran, and the former alliance between Turkey and Israel,
330
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contributed to further instability.331 In addition, Israeli and
Palestinian failure to implement the Oslo accords blocked efforts
to reorder and stabilize the Middle East.332 As discussed above,
arguably the Oslo accords were doomed to fail because the terms
did not meet the interests of either Israel or Palestine. Other
agreements such as that between Israel and Lebanon in 1997 to
address their conflict, only served to allow Lebanon’s two
neighbors, Israel and Syria, to compete, for or against, Lebanon’s
interests and politics.333 Another alternative is the involvement of
regional powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The media
reported in mid 2015 about Turkey and Saudi Arabia forming a
pact to help Syrian rebels fight Syria’s regime, possibly as part of a
proxy war against Iran.334 Two weeks prior to this announcement,
the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations accused the Saudis of
“cultivating a culture of sectarian bloodshed[.]”335
Such a pact likely promotes and perpetuates sectarianism,
exponentially grows divisions among the local groups, and leads to
increased instability, as opposed to Turkey’s and Saudi’s guise of
seeking stability. Unfortunately, these interests will not serve the
region or the global community. For instance, with Syria being
Russia’s final true ally in the area, and with Russia and China
likely to side with Iran, Turkey’s and Saudi’s pact is more likely to
further divide the global community into two sides: the United
States, the European Union, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf states on
one side, and Russia, China, and Iran on the other. In short,
Turkey and Saudi’s pact is an example of regional interests
interfering with local as well as global stability and not as an
attempt with the smallest likelihood of achieving stability.
Tibi points to three competing alternatives for establishing
order in the Middle East: (1) The US-Israeli concept of a new
331
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Middle East that emerged from the Oslo accords; (2) an exclusive
Arab system that gives control to Middle Eastern powers; and (3)
the Euro-Mediterranean community, tying the Middle East and
Europe.336 Each of these alternatives serves one side while
ignoring another. The first alternative favors Israel; while the
second favors Arabic-speaking or Muslim states. The third
alternative supports growth in all the Central Middle Eastern states,
but has not succeeded in addressing Syria’s interests or bringing
Syria into the Middle Eastern market, and has not succeeded in
addressing Jordan’s nor Lebanon’s challenges.
Other methods, such as alternative dispute resolutions,
enable parties to a conflict to evade analyses of, and interventions
in, institutionalized injustices and structural violence. In turn, such
avoidance enables those committing the injustices to continue
enjoying impunity and to legitimize a social structure that favors
the powerful.337 Irani notes that political agreements such as Oslo
displaced international law in practice, and as result rendered
humanitarian law and human rights as negotiable.338
A two-nation state attempt for Israel and Palestine at the
minimum is likely to be harsh on minorities in either nation
state;339 it may also to lead to majoritarian tyranny. It is better to
use territorial and communitarian federalism to allow the law to
regulate between the various communities as opposed to building
separate nations.340 Majoritarian tyranny can be defined as any
violation of the natural or the positive rights of minorities, as
stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights or domestic constitutions.341 Such tyranny is likely to arise
when the majority is self-interested or hostile to minority
336
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concerns,342 such as with the Muslim Palestinian population in
Palestine.
In regard to trade and economics, existing agreements with
integration efforts between Arab states in general have been
ineffective likely due to administrative challenges and insufficient
political commitments.343 Thus, actual and meaningful political
commitments, and legal administrative structures, specifically
among the five states, are necessary to achieve stability, as well as
economic relationships and growth.

VI. BROAD PICTURE OF THE PROPOSED LEGAL STRUCTURE AND
METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION
A. Federal Structure and a Constitution
Analyzing a society in the context of federalism enlists a
tripartite analysis: that of culture (ideologies), politics (legal), and
economics.344
On the other hand, from a constitutional
perspective, the basic staples of federalism include freedom of
movement for people, freedom of capital, and full faith and credit
clauses.345 More specifically, the political ideas of the American
system can be categorized into six groups: 1) representative
republicanism, 2) federalism, 3) separation of powers, 4) equality
before the law, 5) individual autonomy, and 6) procedural
fairness.346
As an example, the American system provides two
inventions—federalism and the Supreme Court.347 As for the
European Union, it is arguable that it is, in fact, progressing in a
direction similar to that of the United States, certainly through its
Court of Justice as a parallel to the United States Supreme Court.
For instance, a unifying dimension to Europe is now the Court of
342
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Justice decision in Costa, making communitarian law prevalent
over any national law.348 Costa said that the European treaty
established a judicial order that is integrated into the legal systems
of member states, and imposes itself on their jurisdictions.349 The
effect is that a law passed in a member state will not stand before a
law passed at the level of the European Union, even if the latter is
in the form of a lower level lawmaking tool—such as a
directive.350
In the Middle East, not a single experiment of unity has
succeeded beyond the existing nation states, along the boundaries
that the colonial powers formed. Taken a step further, it is the
reality of secession that is, in fact, more prevalent.351 On the other
hand, ideas of federalism, and in turn, inter-state cooperation and
unity, remain absent. One explanation that has been presented is
that legal education in the Middle East never carried the
construction of federalism because Middle Eastern legal education
has been entrenched with British and French models, neither of
which has had any experience with federalism.352 Noting that
federalism is an invention, Mallat argues that all unity experiments
in the Middle East have failed because of the legal education’s
failure to introduce federalism as a possible legal structure.353
Part of the risk in federalism; however, is that bringing
democracy to the Middle East, as part of federalism, in the form of
one person-one vote, may result in majority mistreatment of
minorities.354 Moreover, states generally do not volunteer to
protect human rights, and protection of minorities will be
considered unpopular by the government as well as its majoritarian
constituency. Thus, protections must be institutionalized in a
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constitution or through a variety of structural measures.355 For
instance, the United States’ system includes protections in its
Constitution – the Bill of Rights – and entrusts the courts to
enforce these rights and constrain majorities through constitutional
Moreover, the administrative decentralization and
limits.356
reduced sovereignty of the union reduce the prospect of
majoritarian tyranny.357
The Central Middle East may, after all, require an invention
of its own. Nations that have practiced federalism have practiced
“essentially . . . geographical” federalism, employing boundaries to
project the voice of the people within those regions. 358 However,
geographical federalism cannot accommodate all Middle Eastern
countries because of divisions along personal and sectarian
matters.359 An alternative form is communitarian federalism, one
that is not based on geography but on the communities mixed
within boundaries.360 At least two Middle Eastern countries are
experimenting with communitarian federalism: Lebanon and
The Lebanese model achieves some balance by
Israel.361
dedicating the presidency to the Christian Maronite sect, the post
of the Prime Minister to Sunni Muslims, and that of parliament
speaker to Shiʿi Muslims.362 Israel has limited communitarian
federalism through family law; Israel allows Muslims and
Christians to have their own respective courts and allows those of
the Jewish faith to marry according to religious tradition, while the
state implements the courts’ decisions.363 However, Israel’s
system excludes political decisions from federalism, since there
appears to be little Arab representation at the decision-making
level.364
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Moreover, Israel’s security “can only be guaranteed when it
makes peace with the people of the region” and when justice is
given to Palestinians.365 Constitutional reform to allow freedom of
speech and the formation of political parties, among others, should
be part of the agenda,366 in all five states. Thus, there needs to be a
unique accommodation of “both geographical and communitarian
federalism” to address the Middle Eastern society.367
To reach such an arrangement, the five states must reach a
constitution, and then they must respect the supremacy of the
agreed upon and established constitutional values. They can do so
through, for instance, federal preemption, an independent
judiciary, and the will to enforce these values and protections.368
There also needs to be political integration of the various groups
and interests, which in turn requires national institutions and a
security system that are made up of members of all of these
groups.369
Finally, limiting policies such as the doctrine of emergency
law must be considered as a last resort and only for the common
good, with the condition that loss of certain freedoms is temporary
and only to facilitate the return to normalcy and restoration of
human rights.370
Thus, there must be a framework and
enforcement where such policies cannot become permanent and
cannot be implemented to serve the limited interest of one group.
B.Separation of Church and State and Protections of Human
Rights
Secularism is necessary for federalism’s success;
federalism, as a structural remedy, is effective “only when a set of
constitutional, institutional, and social conditions are present[,]”
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including that of secularism.371 Most importantly, federalism
cannot be a substitute for secularism.372
International law, such as through the UDHR bars
distinctions according to religion, among other distinctions and
discriminations.373 To reference the American system, rights are
vested with individuals, and not with religious groups.374 If the
federal state were to provide support for certain religious groups, it
must do the same for all religious groups present, ensuring that all
religious are treated equally.375
Introducing elements of a majority religion into the federal
structure would frustrate the purpose of federalism, in large part
because the structure would fail to prevent majoritarian
oppression.376 The result would likely be discrimination against a
differing religious group, and where non-believers become
subjects, rather than citizens.377 Religion-based federalism also
appeals to divine mandates that the de facto state religion
proscribes, in turn extending divinity to human opinions of
scholars and politicians.378 In addition, divine scripture inhibits
any government to a rigid appeal and stunts the evolution of
federal relations between the constituent states.379
A federal structure in these five states must not integrate
the values, or the rules, of one religion into its legal foundations
and definitions. Such integration, in spite of arguments for
identity, would lead to discrimination as well as inequality, in turn
creating the danger of oppression and then revolt. Thus, at some
point, the five states must recognize the benefits of separating
religion from the state, as opposed to the dangers of integrating
religion with the state.
Finally, the traditional Montevideo Convention criteria for
statehood has expanded such that the fourth attribute of statehood,
371
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the capacity to engage in international relations, arguably now
includes a demonstrated respect for human and minority rights.380
Today, any entity seeking statehood must demonstrate that it will
respect human and minority rights.381 In other words, recognition
of a given state, and its involvement in international trade, cannot
be when that state actively chooses to ignore humanitarian laws
and human rights. We have collectively decided to recognize these
principles.
Ignoring them and refusing to support them
undermines the statehood structure in its entirety and hinders
humanity’s development as a whole.
C. Method of Implementation: Begin Internally
A key internal conflict in the Central Middle East is public
demand for citizenship rights and effective accountable
governments.382 Thus, crucial to successful integration is defining
transitional steps to full integration, and setting a credible timetable
to recognizing rights and building accountable government.383
Leaders of the current five states: (1) must commit to operating
under a federal legal system;384 (2) must meet in a scheduled
manner; (3) must create agreeable federal legal structures; and; (4)
must create roadmaps for implementation. Global powers must
provide support, but must not influence and must not attempt to
coerce these five to accept ideals and values of the Great Powers.
In considering the trend toward regionalization in world
politics, and the ‘“revolt against the West,”’ “any Western
intervention in an Islamic country, even for humanitarian reasons,
would lend support to Islamists’ conspiracy theories[.]”385 Also,
Arabic-speaking rulers consider a desirable system as one of
“multipolar international system that allows for regionalization of
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world politics” as opposed to global order maintained by a
superpower.386
In addition, allowing the five states to design and develop a
desired structure, with only support from global powers, is also
likely to serve long-term interests of the global powers. For
instance, the 9/11 Commission Report noted that long-term
setbacks for American interests often outweighed short-term gains
from cooperating with repressive governments.387 Unfortunately,
Hashemi notes, citing Tomara Coffman Wittes, that the United
States preference for democratic politics in the Arab world has
long been tempered by the belief that “victors of a democratic
process are unlikely to share America’s policy preferences in the
region.”388
Powerful and influential states, such as the United States,
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and Germany, appear to
directly dictate courses of action of less sovereign states.389
In large part, a core issue is that local populations resent
their incorporation into a western-defined world order, where this
order has been based on European norms and values, and not
chosen by the people of the Middle East.390 While a federal
structure is a western concept, a constitution and legal structure
developed, agreed upon, and implemented internally and between
local leaders is more likely to be seen as a locally-invented and
developed structure, and not as a western import. Thus, the
structure must be borne and designed from within to gain traction
and local support.
D. The Great Powers Must Provide Support, But Not Influence
It is unrealistic to separate external interests in the region
from the region, particularly those interests of influential and
powerful states such as the United States, Russian, China, and the
386
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United Kingdom. For instance, as previously stated, Western allies
have continuously supported authoritarian regimes because those
regimes were generally more likely to serve western interests, and
because new forces seemed to drift into revolutionary and antiwestern positions.391
It remains that the United States may be able to effect
change, but, as with the 2003 Iraq invasion, it is clear that it cannot
control what follows.392 In 2006, Singer wrote that the United
States must resolve: (1) how it will support change, while
recognizing that it is unable to control which forces will benefit
from that support, (2) how it will react to reform debate in the
Muslim world without undermining debate; and (3) how it will
respond to the demographic change that will reorder politics and
societies.393
Singer cites Middle East expert, professor Telhami, in
noting that it is a delusion that American programs and efforts can
help build a third alternative to both current governments and
Islamists; rather, the United States must be flexible enough to open
dialogues with the diverse set of actors in the region.394 This
includes Russia as an influential power. As such, global powers, in
large part the United States and Russia, must support federalism as
the long-term vision and meetings between the local leaders to
affect a roadmap towards that vision. Such support must happen
without going so far as to influence the leaders, because any
influence would most likely result in serving opposing external
interests rather than universal interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the Central Middle East is home to
numerous internal interests and conflicts, including ethnic and
religious interests. The region also attracts numerous regional and
global interests. The political and legal structure in this region
391
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arguably pins the five states and their peoples against each other,
such that the only possible result is continuous instability and
insecurity, such as the war in Syria. Moreover, such instability
acts as an obstacle to economic growth, further fueling
fundamentalism. Past attempts at unions, such as those between
Syria and Egypt, and Israel and Palestine, were short-lived and did
not succeed. Agreements and treaties, including the Oslo treaty
between Israel and Palestine, have failed to affect peace and
stability. Federalism for the five states is a solution because it can
address the core internal interests of each groups, while also
leading each group to concede interests that inherently conflict
with those of other groups.
For example, federalism would lead to a separation
between church and state and can afford all religious groups
equality; on the other hand, agreement between the five states over
legal structure and federal institutions would allow such equality
credibility as well as enforceability. In addition, federalism
encourages economic growth, which in turn would act to abate
factors that encourage fundamentalism. Federalism would also
strengthen the five states in such a manner as to become better able
to address the conflicting global interests, while at the same time
serving those global interests by being better positioned to
contribute to the global community.
In conclusion, it is clear and unarguable that the current
political and legal structure in the Central Middle East has been an
abysmal failure. The constant instability and insecurity are clear
indications of this failure. The issue lies in the structure itself, as
one not envisioned by the local populations, and as one that pins
the local populations against each other. Federalism, locally
devised and globally supported, would allow these groups to
address their interests and devise a legal structure that allows them
to co-exist and to grow economically.
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